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
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TOOLS OF DIPLOMACY



GUEST ENTRY BY DR. SEIDT

*Former Inspector General of the German
Foreign Office Hans-Ulrich Seidt*

Realism or Idealism: The Regulation of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems through Meaningful Human Control

Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems are the latest contested development in warfare. This article will examine different approaches to their regulation and how they are incorporated into the framework of International Relations and International Law while also highlighting the ethical and practical debate at the heart of the issue.

Powering Ahead: Fortifying EU Relations through Hydrogen Trade

Hydrogen may be the champagne of the energy transition. The text analyses development of hydrogen economy and its impact on EU and international relations.

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FOREWORD

 **Theodor Himmel**

Theodor Himmel studied law in Cologne and, after his first state exam, completed an Advanced LL.M. programme in International Procedural Law at Leiden University. He is interested in mediation and government affairs and participated in the VIS Moot during his studies.



About the Magazine

The EPIS magazine has grown. With the second issue, it is not only half a year older, but also more voluminous. The core of six scientific articles has been realized again. Additionally, there are other article formats such as columns by our members, contributions by guests, greetings from partners and our new information format EPIS Basics. In this way, we continue to pursue our scientific approach and at the same time improve the experience of you readers by providing you varied perspectives through shorter contributions.

The magazine is a product of the work of many. The authors of the articles have worked long hours on the articles over the past months, revising among themselves and correcting them themselves. We would also like to thank our guests Dr. Seidt and our cooperation partners from the Prometheus Institute and the Young Transatlantic Initiative. They took the time to contribute to our magazine with their greetings and thoughts.

This issue of EPIS Magazine is dedicated to diplomacy in international foreign affairs and security policy. In the academic articles, the authors explore the various diplomatic aspects in international politics. They illustrate it with concrete examples or by showing it through abstract questions. The guest contribution by Dr. Seidt, as a former ambassador, can contribute his own experience when it comes to diagnosing the art of prognosis. The column contribution by Sophie Schirmer completes the series of contributions by reporting on the World Youth Day of the Catholic Church and showing the connection to international diplomacy.

Diplomacy is the art of negotiation. And art is a craft. Every artist crafts with his own diplomatic tools. As individual as the diplomatic tools are, as different are the works of art on the stage of diplomacy. In international foreign affairs and security policy, the maxim of peacekeeping is pursued. But all too often artists become magicians, shrouding the diplomatic stage in bang and smoke - or is it just an artistic illusion after all? This magazine looks at the tools of diplomacy and explores the idea raised by Clausewitz's "On War": war as a mere continuation of politics by other means (?).

We wish you a pleasant time reading!

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Theodor Himmel', written over a horizontal line.

Theodor Himmel

Editor-in-chief and chairman of
EPIS Thinktank e.V.

GREETINGS FROM PROMETHEUS

 **Clemens Schneider**

Clemens Schneider is cofounder and director of Prometheus, a Berlin based organization that aims to educate and network the coming generation of liberal thinkers and activists.



[Find out more about Prometheus Institute](#)



PROMETHEUS
DAS FREIHEITSINSTITUT

"I am so angry at us as we have historically failed. After Georgia, Crimea and Donbass, we did not prepare anything that would have really deterred Putin," tweeted former German Defence Minister Annegret Kamp-Karrenbauer on the day Russia expanded its occupation of Ukrainian territory, which had been in place since 2014, into a full war of aggression. In doing so, she presented a refreshing contrast to many active and former European and, above all, German top politicians who wanted to make believe that such a scenario could not have been anticipated.

Sound foreign and security policy, however, depends on foresight. That is the essential difference between tactics and strategy. The free world in particular, i.e. countries characterised by the rule of law and free co-determination, must have a long-term sustainable strategy to deal with threats to the international order as well as to national integrity.

In retrospect, Germany's energy policy, for example, shows how dangerous a lack of strategic awareness can be. For German and European citizens, the financial consequences are high; for the people in Ukraine, their very existence is at stake. The same strategic deficits have arisen in dealing with the People's Republic of China. And despite the obvious Russian example, dependencies are still being built and expanded according to the same pattern and with almost word-for-word arguments.

Foreign and security policy need the big picture. It is therefore absolutely crucial that information and its evaluation be fed into public debates as well as into expert circles in as diverse and knowledgeable a manner as possible. The fact that EPIS offers young voices a forum is particularly important in this context for two reasons: on the one hand, because the

thought leaders of tomorrow find their first platforms here to make their voices heard and to exchange ideas. And on the other hand, because young people in particular can often offer refreshing perspectives that are not stuck in the entrenched schemes and thought patterns of times past. The Russia policy has shown it and the China policy will prove it: Many of the politicians and academics have failed with horrific consequences because they were trapped in the stories and assessments of times long past.

US senator and presidential candidate John McCain gave a landmark speech on foreign policy at the Hoover Institution at Stanford in May 2007. At a time when Xi Jinping had just been freshly transferred to Shanghai as party secretary, and when Putin had not even ordered the occupation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, he saw crystal clear the imperialist threat posed by these countries. His words show that already then there were people who saw it coming. Those who did not look away. And they spoke up about it, even if they would then be accused of sabre-rattling and warmongering.

The core of the speech is the demand that liberal democracies worldwide should move closer together militarily, economically and politically, in a "league of democracies". Towards the end, he makes a crucial observation that I would like to urge the readers and authors of this magazine to bear in mind. Long-term strategic thinking and values-based foreign and security policy are the best way to sustainably protect one's own order and interests. "We were right to struggle for democracy then, and we are right to do so now. This is not idealism, my friends. It is the truest kind of realism. Today as in the past, our interests are inextricably linked to the global progress of our ideals."

29 August 2023

GREETINGS FROM YOUNG TRANS- ATLANTIC INITIATIVE

Tobias Bauer

Tobias Bauer has been President of the Initiative junger Transatlantiker e. V. since 2021. This organisation promotes intensive cooperation between the European Union and its transatlantic partners - on a social, cultural and political level. Since 2022, he has been the spokesperson for the state working group on international affairs of Bündnis 90/Die Grünen in Rhineland-Palatinate and a delegate to the federal working group. He studies business education at the Johannes Gutenberg University in Mainz.



[Find out more about Young Transatlantic Initiative](#)



Dear readers of EPIS Magazine,

We live in a time when geopolitical challenges are becoming more complex. In this troubled world situation, the partnership of the European Union and its transatlantic partners in the US, Canada and Mexico is more important than ever.

Recent developments in various geopolitical hotspots - first and foremost Putin's horrific war of aggression on Ukraine - have shown us the fluctuations to which the international order is subject. In such times, it is essential that we, the countries of the free world, join forces and pursue a common strategy in partnership. Transatlantic relations are not only a pillar of stability, but also a motor for innovation and progress.

We, the Young Transatlanticists Initiative, have therefore dedicated ourselves to promoting this important relationship. We are convinced that the young generation in particular must play a key role in shaping a sustainable foreign and security policy. Our initiative therefore offers young people a platform to contribute their ideas and visions and to actively participate in the political discussion.


In the current situation, in which populist currents are trying to make their mark, it is all the more important to emphasise the importance of the transatlantic partnership. We must be aware that our common values - the defence of human rights and our commitment to democracy - cannot be taken for granted. They must be defended, which can only be done in a united community of like-minded nations standing hand in hand for the highest ideals of humanity.

But transatlantic relations are not only a question of politics, but also of the people who shape them. That is why it is important for us as young transatlanticists to promote talent and give them the opportunity to contribute their perspectives to questions of foreign and security policy. Since EPIS Magazine also makes a valuable contribution in this regard and provides a forum for young voices, the opportunity to formulate a greeting fills me with great gratitude.

Finally, I would like to conclude with the words of former US President John F. Kennedy: "Freedom is indivisible, and if even one is enslaved, then all are not free." These words gain relevance again today and should remind us all that the transatlantic partnership is not just an alliance, but a community of nations fighting for the same ideals.

I wish you a stimulating read and look forward to future cooperation with our friends at the EPIS ThinkTank.

*Yours sincerely,
Tobias Bauer*



Realism or Idealism: The Regulation of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems through Meaningful Human Control

This article was reviewed by Johannes Hollunder



Elie Castanie [in](#)

Elie Castanie is currently studying for a Bachelor's degree in International Relations at Karlshochschule in Karlsruhe. He is involved at the Initiative der Jungen Transatlantiker e.V. pursuing his interests in German-American relations.

I. Introduction

The weapons of war are constantly advancing at a rapid pace and some, like chemical weapons, are deemed so dangerous that their use is banned in armed conflicts around the world (ICRC Database, n.d.a). But the decision to ban certain weapons is not made easily. It requires substantial negotiation and deliberation by international actors. The tool of warfare that has recently come under such scrutiny originates from the technological advancements of the 21st century and is called Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS) (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2022). This paper will analyse the current debate surrounding LAWS to shed light on the conflicts at the heart of the topic to ascertain the likelihood of their regulation and to assess possibilities for the characteristics that such regulation might contain. To achieve this, after defining Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, it is first necessary to build a concrete understanding of the actors involved in this process. This will be done through the perspectives of Realist and Liberalist International Relations theory to establish the main arguments of those in favour and against a ban on these instruments of war.

The weapons of war are constantly advancing at a rapid pace and some, like chemical weapons, are deemed so dangerous that their use is banned in armed conflicts around the world (ICRC Database, n.d.a). But the decision to ban certain weapons is not made easily. It requires substantial negotiation and deliberation by international actors. The tool of warfare that has recently come under such scrutiny originates from the technological advancements of

the 21st century and is called Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS) (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2022). This paper will analyse the current debate surrounding LAWS to shed light on the conflicts at the heart of the topic to ascertain the likelihood of their regulation and to assess possibilities for the characteristics that such regulation might contain. To achieve this, after defining Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, it is first necessary to build a concrete understanding of the actors involved in this process. This will be done through the perspectives of Realist and Liberalist International Relations theory to establish the main arguments of those in favour and against a ban on these instruments of war.

From these positions, it is then vital to elaborate on the issue of Meaningful Human Control, the central point of argument in the regulation of LAWS. This will be realized through a consideration of the practical, ethical, and legal issues at the heart of this debate. Furthermore, by employing positivism and legal process theory, this paper will establish two possible approaches to the reception and importance of international legislation aiding in the assessment of this process. Last, through the combination of the International Relations and the International Law perspective, a conclusion will be formed, giving insight into two possible ways that the debate surrounding the regulation of LAWS might develop in the future, clearing a path toward a clear understanding and resolution of the issue. Before commencing the analysis of the actors involved in this debate, it is necessary to define the contested term of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems.

One definition of LAWS attaches "the capability to independently compose and select among different courses of action to accomplish goals based on its knowledge and

understanding of the world, itself, and the situation” to these autonomous systems while also integrating clear boundaries in which these actions have to take place (David and Nielsen 2016, p. 4). While this definition provides an idea of the characteristics of LAWS, it does not perfectly encompass and define Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, which is the first issue in this debate since different actors utilize different definitions, therefore causing part of the ongoing debate surrounding their regulation.

Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems: Advanced weapon systems that incorporate artificial intelligence to make decisions with no or limited human input. This autonomy raises ethical and practical concerns regarding their effectiveness and safety, making their development and use contested on the international stage.

II. Actors Explained

Commencing with the analysis of the actors involved, it is vital to do so from two different perspectives, since this enables a dive into the multitude of actors and their motivations. Therefore, both realist and liberalist theory will be utilized to ascertain the different actors involved and the conclusions that can be drawn from their stances and arguments. While the question of weapon development and regulation naturally falls into the domain of the nation-state, the issue of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems is highly complex and further involves international (IO) and non-governmental (NGO) organizations. Furthermore, although most nations are in favour of regulating or even banning LAWS, some, like the United States, are

actively developing them while also working against their regulation (Human Rights Watch, 2020). But why are some states against regulation while others are in favor and what role do IOs and their non-governmental counterparts play?


1. Realism

Before analysing the actors from a realist point of view, it is necessary to establish its key considerations and assumptions. The realist perspective focuses on nation-states as the primary actors on the international stage and assumes that the lack of a supranational authority results in an anarchical society dominated by hard, military power, and an environment of self-help (Bull, Hurrell, and Hoffman, 2012). This selfishness furthermore creates a lack of trust (Jervis, 1978) which makes long term international cooperation unfeasible since states will always seek to strive for hegemony by maximizing their power, thus creating IOs that only serve as tools for powerful states to further their interests (Mearsheimer, 1994, 12-14). Through these assumptions about the international system, international organizations and NGOs can be disregarded in this analysis, since their actions only reflect the will of the powerful nation-states behind them. Instead, this section will focus on the reasons of those nations developing these weapons to establish their political motivations, while also ascertaining the efforts made by those states that work toward the regulation of LAWS.

Looking at those nations that are in possession of LAWS and those that are actively developing them, commonalities emerge. The Human Rights Watch report “Stopping Killer Robots” ascertained the stance of 97 countries and found that Australia, China, Israel, Russia, South Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States are investing

in the development of LAWS (2020). While these nations seem to have little in common at first glance, through the realist perspective they can be divided into two categories. The first category encompasses those states that are striving for the position of global hegemon. In this conflict between China, Russia, and the United States realist theory emphasizes the primacy of military power, and it is thus no surprise that these actors are against the regulation of LAWS since this would arti-

ficially limit their capabilities in comparison to other nations without the resources to do so as well. Therefore, while acknowledging the need for clear definitions and caution, these nations oppose any concrete legislation beyond the existing framework of international humanitarian law (IHL), even though they emphasize the need for sufficient human control over these weapon systems (Government of China, 2018; Government of Russia, 2017; Government of the United States, 2018).



Source: Human Rights Watch (2020)

The second category on the other hand is not in pursuit of global hegemony but rather, their stance in favour of LAWS stems from a drive for regional hegemony or, in the case of Israel and South Korea, a conflict situation that necessitates the use of all available technologies. Once again, realist theory offers explanations that are grounded in the primacy of state security and the projection of power in their areas of influence. Therefore, these states present similar arguments when discussing Lethal Autonomous Weapon

Systems, which also focus on definitions and existing IHL without arguing in favour of additional legislation (Government of Australia, 2013; Government of Israel, 2014; Government of the Republic of Korea, 2018; Government of Turkey 2016; Government of the United Kingdom, 2013). Furthermore, while these nations argue against any regulation of LAWS beyond existing IHL, other states strongly favour the development of legislation that either ensures Meaningful Human Control (Governments of Austria, Brazil, and Chile 2018), or

bans LAWS outright (Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, 2018). These stances are taken by nations with less military power and developmental capabilities or by those without direct threats to their security. From a realist perspective, it is thus in their interest to prevent other nations from developing a significant military advantage, which explains the stance of those in favour and against the regulation of LAWS from a viewpoint of military power and international anarchy. This points to the conclusion that the states seeking regulation will require sufficient hard power to achieve their objective.

2. Liberalism

Moving into the realm of liberalism, the same actors can be assessed differently, therefore creating a different outlook on the LAWS debate. While liberalism also views states as the primary actors in the international system, it focuses on ways that they cooperatively interact with one another through their dependence on other states (Keohane and Nye, 1973). Additionally, instead of the focus on the hard power of realism, liberalism focuses on laws and norms as tools to mitigate the effects of anarchy, an approach that leads to the democratic peace theory, which argues that liberal, democratic states will not fight one another due to their shared values (Doyle, 1997). Therefore, liberalism also considers the importance of international institutions in this cooperative environment since they provide a stage for discussion while also acknowledging that international politics is influenced by domestic discussions (Smith and Ikenberry, 2001).

The liberalist viewpoint thus considers actors beyond the nation-state, as well as different motivations of the governmental ones. While the issue of LAWS is primarily discussed

between states at forums like the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, their statements and arguments are supplemented by a range of NGOs that lobby for a ban of these weapon systems (Stopping Killer Robots, 2018). This involvement of other actors highlights the importance of discussion that is present in liberalist theory. This is further supplemented by the extensive debate on this issue that has taken place at the Human Rights Council since 2013 (Human Rights Watch, 2020) and has also prompted calls for regulation from the UN Secretary General (Guterres, 2018). Through this the liberalist notion of values and norms is made clear, as is the importance of international institutions as platforms for mediation. Additionally, the statement by Secretary General Guterres also shows the agency of non-state actors and the impact that they have. Therefore, the liberalist perspective frames this debate through as cooperative where states as the main actors discuss their positions on LAWS through diplomacy to reach a conclusion since they are constrained by international legislation that prevents the use of military power to solve disputes.

III. Meaningful Human Control

After establishing the key actors in this issue and their motivations, it is now necessary to elaborate on one of the main issues in the debate surrounding the regulation of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, which is the concept of Meaningful Human Control. While there is little consensus on whether regulation of these weapons systems is required or not, the need for sufficient human control over them is broadly accepted, which resulted in a guiding principle on human-machine interaction that ensures the use of LAWS in accordance with IHL (Human Rights Council, 2019). On the other hand, although this represents progress

in the regulation of LAWS, it is not of binding character, and thus this requires an analysis of the core dispute at the heart of this debate and how this integrates into the existing legal framework to then gain insights into the future of this regulatory process.

1. Legal Framework

A further aspect that requires consideration is the existing legal framework concerning the limitation and restriction of certain weapons and how it could be used to find a solution in the debate surrounding Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems. This legal framework can be divided into two separate categories; those laws that govern the use of weapons, and those that ban them outright. Looking at the laws that govern the weapons and methods used in war, there are several key principles that have to be considered. Several of these can be found in Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions, first, the principle of Distinction which only allows the use of military force against military targets, this is then followed by a ban of indiscriminate attacks against civilians and a duty to take precautions in attacks that prevent civilian casualties (OHCHR, n.d.).

These principles of international law are at the core of the controversy surrounding LAWS and provide severe challenges for their use. Since these weapons act based on numerical programming, the definition of complex, human focused, terms would have to occur in numerical form while also requiring the ability to reliably differentiate between combatants and civilians. Furthermore, these systems would also be required to predict the consequences of the use of different weapons and variables to gauge the extent of its actions to avoid indiscriminate attacks (Boulanin et al., 2010). It is be-

cause of these challenges that most actors either argue in favour of Meaningful Human Control or a complete ban of LAWS to prevent scenarios in which these weapons are implementing measures unintended by humans.

2. Effectiveness or Ethics

These challenges and concerns regarding the development and use of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems are addressed through the retention and implementation of Meaningful Human Control. This concept aims to negate the issues faced by LAWS in the context of International Humanitarian Law by integrating procedures through which humans retain sufficient control over these weapons in the realms of target selection, the context of their use, and the ability to intervene to comply with IHL while still utilizing the benefits that this new technology provides (Boulanin et al., 2010, pp. 8-9). While this is partly due to the practical concerns regarding the effectiveness of these weapons, it also reflects the moral concerns that machines killing human beings raises. This consideration creates an argument where effectiveness and ethics stand at odds. Many NGOs raise the concern that this progression in military technology will lead to the dehumanization of warfare and that the agency of warfare should remain with humans and not be delegated to machines (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2022; Human Rights Watch, 2021). These ethical concerns stand in contrast to the argument that LAWS, through their superior capabilities, are able to more effectively adhere to IHL standards and regulations (Government of the United States, 2019). This difference in regard to the use of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems once again highlights the differences

between actors and their motivations that were shown earlier, while also providing the foundation for the analysis through theories of international law.

IV. Legal consequences

Having established the political dynamics that surround the regulation of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, the next consideration to be made revolves around the nature of international law and the implication that this carries for the regulatory process that is currently underway. This paper will discuss two different approaches to international law in the form of positivism and legal process theory to highlight two paths toward the regulation of LAWS that coincide with the international relations approaches of realism and liberalism, which will serve to create a complete picture of the interaction of international relations and international law.

1. Positivism

Commencing with the positivist perspective, it is first required to establish its position regarding the nature and effectiveness of international law. At the core of this approach to law is the separation of laws and morals, while also emphasizing the hierarchical nature of law (Hart, 1958). Therefore, international law cannot be considered true law from a positivist perspective, since it is a product of self-imposed limita-

tions that can be reversed and not of a coercive nature due to the absence of a higher authority (Jellinek, 1919). This view of international law can explain several issues that can be observed in the process to regulate LAWS. One key issue is the decision-making structure at CCW meetings. There, all decisions have to be made by consensus (Human Rights Watch, 2020) which reflects the absence of a supranational authority that can coerce actors while the focus on the efficiency of LAWS and the seeming disregard for moral considerations by some actors further shows the positivist division of laws and morals.

Through these observations, the positivist perspective highlights the challenges faced by international law in the process of regulating LAWS since there is little incentive for states to comply with existing, and to negotiate new legislation, due to the absence of binding legislation and serious repercussions.

NGOs raise the concern that this progression in military technology will lead to the dehumanization of warfare and that the agency of warfare should remain with humans and not be delegated to machines.

2. Legal Process Theory


While a positivist approach to international law helps analyse the weaknesses of international law in this debate, it also leaves other facets unanswered. Thus, a look at the legal challenges faced in the regulation of LAWS from the perspective of legal process theory will aid by providing another perspective with different consequences. At the core of this approach challenges the positivist separation of laws and morals, instead viewing them as a combined decision-making process beyond the mere ap-

plication of rules (Higgins, 1995). Furthermore, legal process theory takes on a prescriptive approach based upon liberal values, chief among which human dignity, to argue that this reflects the struggle of different value systems on the international stage (McDougal, 1959). This is then supplemented by a view that international law has a large impact on international relations due to its regulatory powers which states adhere to (Henkin, 1968). Looking at the LAWS debate from this perspective, the continuous discussion can be interpreted positively as the continued exchange of values that build toward a shared norm that can then be implemented as international law. Furthermore, the focus on Meaningful Human Control as a core point of agreement highlights the liberal values of the international system, therefore framing the current debate as a starting point in the process of regulating Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, rather than the minimal possible compromise on this issue. This is supported by a glance at past efforts to ban weapons of war, namely the 1997 landmine ban treaty (ICRC Database, n.d.b) which can be viewed as a precursor to this debate due to the autonomous characteristics of landmines, thus setting a precedent for successful cooperation in efforts to limit the use of autonomous weapons.

V. Conclusion

In conclusion, the debate surrounding the regulation of Lethal Autonomous Weapon

Systems is characterized by a conflict between ethical concerns and the effectiveness of artificial intelligence in war and therefore be analysed from different perspectives. Realist and positivist theory highlight the anarchical nature of the international system and the importance that hard power plays in the security of states, while also incorporating the absence of coercive measures of the international legal system. Thus, looking at the future evolution of LAWS from this perspective, it is clear that the development of these weapons is not dependent on moral considerations but rather purely on the security of states which will likely result in the development of LAWS by those that either strive for hegemony or those that perceive their security as threatened. Furthermore, any additional legislation on this issue would have little power since it will be the result of a minimal consensus that further relies on enforcement by the very states that are currently developing these weapons. On the other hand, through liberalist and legal process theory, the same situation can be assessed differently. The ongoing negotiations on this issue reflect the willingness of all international actors, state or non-state, to engage in dialogue to achieve a peaceful resolution to this debate that incorporates moral considerations instead of pure military needs into a solution. Additionally, the progress toward Meaningful Human Control as a central element of future LAWS can be



seen as more than a minimal consensus and rather as a starting point in the legal process that enables future legislation on this topic.

Combining both of these theoretical frameworks yields an outlook that combines conflict and cooperation. While the large number of international treaties and legal interactions between states support the liberalist perspective and its cooperative approach, the recent invasion in Ukraine and other conflicts around the world highlight the anarchical and conflictive nature of the current international system, where security of the state will always be of

the highest priority. Therefore, this analysis reveals the duality of the international arena, where conflict is intertwined with cooperation and that international legislation is at the core of this process since states always frame their actions as legitimate. Under this view, the question regarding the regulation of LAWS is grounded in a power struggle of competing views and legislation where Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems will only be regulated once their capabilities and limitations are clearly established, and public opinion is in favour or against their existence.

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Continuity and Change in the Middle Eastern Security Landscape

This article was reviewed by Justyna Kanas



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Introduction

In a world in which interstate wars have returned, rapid technological changes are afoot and transnational challenges abound, the Middle East has been struggling to strike the right balance between continuity and change. For some time now, the dominant overarching theme regarding the Middle East has been the real or perceived American retreat from the region. After a hard pivot toward the Middle East in the aftermath of September 11th, the US became deeply engaged in the region and deployed a "forward strategy of freedom." However, after years of military engagement without clear results that would lead to a conclusion of these deployments and in the wake of the rise of a new strategic competitor and rival, China, the US began to shift resources and attention in order to "pivot to Asia". This shift has become the overriding strategic narrative on all levels of the American government. Notably, this narrative did not begin during the Biden administration but has been a policy feature of the last three American administrations, spanning the partisan divide.

Given the long-term implications of an America less committed to supporting and upholding the regional security architecture, and given that many countries in the region depend on the US for their defence, countries in the Middle East have begun adapting and making significant changes to their security and foreign policy. This is true especially for the countries who currently wield the most power in the region and therefore have the most to lose from failing to adapt: Israel, Iran, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia all are engaged in strategic maneuvering in order to better position themselves in a multipolar world in which great power competition has become a permanent feature.

In light of this complex strategic landscape, what are the most important trends that are going to shape the future of the Middle East? This article will analyse and lay out three of the most noteworthy regional trends undertaken by and through those countries, namely the Abraham Accords*, the Saudi-Iranian détente and the emergence of China as a major player in the Middle East. While each of these trends are important in of themselves, taken together they paint a vivid picture of the regional dynamics happening today. The Abraham Accords and other normalization initiatives have the potential to end the decades-old Israeli-Arab conflict. The Saudi-Iranian détente is an important turning point in the relations between the champions of Sunni and Shia Islam. The increasing presence of China in Middle Eastern affairs has the potential to upend the regional security order that was established after the end of World War 2.

Although a multitude of changes are afoot within the region, many have not yet fully played out or lack wide-ranging consequences. This article will focus on the most consequential ones that already have occurred in the last years. Often described as a region plagued by chronic instability and exceptional volatility, the article will argue that the three trends mentioned have the potential to shape the region in the realm of security and diplomacy in the years to come. Furthermore, the article will argue that understanding these regional dynamics will be of great importance for policy and decision makers who seek to navigate the Middle East of tomorrow and effectively enact policies that are in line with the new realities.

Abraham Accords at Year Three

In September 2020, an unlikely breakthrough in Middle Eastern politics took place - the signing of the Abraham Accords, the first peace accords between Israel and Arab states since 1994. In a stunning reverse of the Khartoum Resolution of 1967 ("no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with Israel and no peace with Israel") adopted by the Arab League, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan all pledged to normalise relations with Israel. Prior to the agreements, a dangerous situation had materialised in which Prime Minister Netanyahu, as part of the "Deal of the Century" Trump administration peace plan, sought to apply sovereignty over 20% of the West Bank, a fact that created a domestic and regional crisis. Only after the United Arab Emirates offered normalisation in return for stopping this move did the opportunity for a peace deal arise. This was not something that was necessarily in the cards for the US or Israel, and Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ), President of the UAE, deserves much credit for guiding this initiative in a positive direction. Now coming up on their third year, the Abraham Accords have only gained in importance.

Overall, it's fair to say the Abraham Accords are a success story: The accords led to the establishment of a number of regional multilateral initiatives, such as the Negev Forum with its six multilateral working groups cooperating on clean energy, healthcare, regional security, tourism, water and food security, and education and Co-existence (US Department of State, January 10th, 2023). The I2U2 grouping (United States, Israel, UAE and India) seeks to deepen technological and private sector collaboration and tackle transnational challenges in the areas of water, energy, transportation, space, health and food security (Markey & Youssef, 2022). Project Prosperity Green-Blue, renewable solar energy

from Jordan for water from Israel through Emirati investment, was proposed to help address challenges posed by climate change on water and energy security in the Middle East (Government of Israel, November 8th, 2022). Other regional initiatives not directly linked to but supported by the signing of the Abraham Accords like the EMFG (East Mediterranean Gas Forum), established in 2019 as a joint project between Israel and Egypt, are also gaining in importance, given the ongoing war in Ukraine and the growing interest of the EU in energy imports from the Mediterranean.

Abraham Accords: The Abraham Accords are a series of historic agreements signed in 2020 between Israel and several Arab states, including the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan. They marked the normalisation of diplomatic relations, encompassing cooperation across diverse sectors. The accords signify a noteworthy shift in regional dynamics, fostering peace and cooperation among nations that had previously not officially recognised or had limited relations with Israel.

One of the most encouraging outcomes has been the blossoming of intercultural and interfaith dialogue between the members of the Accords. Over 150,000 Israeli tourists have visited the UAE in 2022 and the UAE has made a serious and lasting commitment to political and religious tolerance symbolised by the opening of the Abrahamic Family House complex, with talks of expanding the format to other nations in the Middle East. In contrast to the cold peace with Egypt and Jordan, where political normalisation has never trickled down to the rest of the population, the Abraham Accords are fostering a warm peace and mutual understanding both

on the level of the government and of the people. This trend is especially pronounced amongst the younger generation: According to the 2023 Arab Youth Survey, a majority of Arab youth in the UAE and Morocco strongly support normalisation with Israel (Bergel, June 21st, 2023). The importance of this should not be underestimated, as it is important in two ways: firstly, strengthening the hand of moderate Muslim nations in the region and normalise having peaceful relations with Israel, and secondly, empowering the voices of moderation and pragmatism inside Israel that have grown progressively weaker since the failure of the Oslo process.

However, there are distinct obstacles with each of the accord members. While relations with the UAE have taken off, the two countries are still in a period of adjustment, getting to know each other and understanding how the other works. The UAE operates in a top-down manner and wants to move fast on a lot of initiatives, something that is not always possible for Israel as it is a democracy that has to work through government bureaucracy. Diplomatic engagement has been somewhat downgraded over remarks and actions by some members of the Netanyahu government, and the fact that Naftali Bennett landed a meeting with President Mohamed bin Zayed before Prime Minister Netanyahu has also caused some frustration in Jerusalem. Furthermore, much more work remains to be done with Bahrain, especially on the economic front. The FTA between the two countries is still not finalised, and there is a need to show that making peace actually delivers "dividends". The number of Bahrainis who have visited Israel and vice versa has remained limited (Na'eh, June 5th, 2023) and the controversy over changes to Bahraini textbooks unfortunately has become politicised and will likely be pushed off into the future (Al

Arabiya English, May 11th, 2023). Bahrain is widely perceived as a Saudi client state, so the more that Bahraini ties with Israel flourish, the more opportunities there will be to demonstrate the viability of a Israeli-Saudi relationship. Fortunately, relations with Morocco are making progress and Israel's recognition of the Western Sahara in June 2023 will likely give a strong tailwind to the partnership as this issue is perceived today as a key political issue in Morocco. Moroccans that support the growing ties between the two countries often point out that normalising ties with Israel merely formalised an existing and historical relationship (Tel Quel, 2020). Israeli's of Moroccan descent are the second-largest community in the country, and there is much cultural affinity between Morocco and Israel. Lastly, Sudan was supposed to be a full member of the Abraham Accords but has descended into civil war before being able to implement them. The Horn of Africa is a strategically important region for Israel, and thus Jerusalem has a vested interest in bringing the fighting to a close as soon as possible and helping to bring about a return to normalcy and stability.

Egypt and Jordan so far have dragged their feet on the Abraham Accords, each for their own reasons, which has caused frustration with Israelis and Americans. Relations with the Jordanians especially have turned decidedly cold and are going in a dangerously negative direction, with a Jordanian member of parliament arrested for attempting to smuggle 200 hand guns into the West Bank illustrating this trend (Times of Israel 2023). Israel is actively seeking to integrate the Jordanians, as well as the Palestinians, into some of the regional fora such as the Negev Forum, but as long as the security situation remains volatile progress on this front will be difficult. The election of Benjamin Net-

anyahu's government, which includes extremist parties, has also raised concern in Arab capitals. Yet, given the strategic realities of most of the Abraham Accord countries and America's growing support for them, one can expect a progression on the Accords, albeit at a slower pace.

Besides trying to deepen the Accords, another challenge will be to broaden the circle of peace. The State Department has made clear it is actively trying to bring more countries into the Accords, first and foremost the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. However, the triangular relationship between the US, Israel and Saudi Arabia is extremely complex and a lot of geopolitical and strategic issues have to align to make it happen. Moreover, the fact that the United States is heading into an election year in 2024 and the fact that the Saudis have no apparent reason to rush into normalisation with Israel are

all factors that could frustrate such a move in the short term. Besides Saudi Arabia, there are talks of other moderate Arab nations that could join, but there is no doubt that relations with Saudi Arabia would initiate a domino effect.

American involvement in the Accords has been interesting to observe. In the beginning, the Biden administration was extremely hesitant to embrace the Abraham Accords and recognize them as a positive achievement of the Trump administration, even going months without ever calling them by their name (Kredo, June 4th, 2021). With the formulation of the National Security Strategy and after the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan, the administration found its footing in terms of its approach to the region, as de-escalation, integration and stability have become key concepts. In this context, the Abraham Accords make a lot of sense and can contribute positively to regional

cooperation, thus the administration has begun to adopt and even encourage the framework. That being said, the Middle East is not a priority for the administration and is now mostly preoccupied with managing conflicts and fostering a realistic approach towards regional integration rather than becoming deeply enmeshed in long-term projects and grand strategies.

Regional Détente: Iran and Saudi Arabia

A very surprising turn of security policy in the Middle East at the beginning of 2023 was the announcement by Iran and Saudi Arabia, with China's blessing, to abandon their hostile relations in favour of a policy of détente. A new level of cooperation at the economic, political and security levels should be ushered in (AP, March 16th, 2023). Due to the prominent position of the Iranian regime in the security policy of the region, the Iranian side of this project deserves a closer look.

Policymaking in the Islamic Republic of Iran is characterised by an exceptionally high degree of inter-factional and related interpersonal conflict (Thaler et al., 2010, pp. 67-68). For this reason, it is important to take a look at the actors acting in each case and their specific political background. At the forefront of the new opening towards Saudi Arabia, Ali Shamkhani, chairman of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, emerged as an apparent driving force and key actor (AP, March 16th, 2023). No stranger to the international stage, he enjoys a reputation as a pragmatic politician, especially towards Arab states. This quality sets him apart from the mainstream of Iranian politics. From 1997 to 2005, he was part of President Khatami's cabinet as Defence Minister. In addition to

being a member of the Revolutionary Guard, he was also the naval commander of the regular armed forces (Boroujerdi & Rahimkhani, 2018, p. 742). At the time of his assumption of office in 1997, Shamkhani was already considered to be a military man with few ideological and political affiliations. Since that time, he has been regarded as a strong representative of the pragmatic wing of Iranian politics. This makes him a strong contrast to the currently incumbent radical President Raisi. He held moderate positions towards the Arab states early on in his political past. In one of his first announcements after taking office, he declared his support for a policy of détente with the Gulf states (Pollack, 1997). Later, he was to become a confidant of Rohani (Dehghanpisheh, 2014). In contrast to his leading role in the desired détente with Saudi Arabia, Shamkhani was unexpectedly removed from his position as chairman of the Security Council in May 2023. The vacant post was filled by a previously low-profile IRGC representative, increasing the organisation's control over the institution. Much like the fallen-from-mercy former President Ahmadinejad, Shamkhani was appointed to the Expediency Council (Ebrahim, 2023). These circumstances point into the direction of power-political measures. It is quite possible that Shamkhani, who is regarded as extremely ambitious, has been perceived as a threat by parts of the regime or Ali Khamenei himself. This is particularly plausible as his power within the apparatus and his long-standing closeness to the moderate camp form a sharp contrast to the regime's strong tendency towards radicalisation since Raisi's election in 2021 and even more so since the beginning of the current protest movement in September 2022. According to analysts, there must have been fears that Shamkhani would personally



Picture: Bahrain's Foreign Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid al-Zayani, Egypt's Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry, Israel's Foreign Minister Yair Lapid, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Morocco's Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita and United Arab Emirates' Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan pose for a photograph during the Negev Summit in Sde Boker, Israel March 28, 2022. (U.S. Department of State, public domain)

take credit for the rapprochement with Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states (Ebrahim, 2023). As in many areas of Iranian politics, the recent developments vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia are a field of internal power conflicts. To what extent the personnel changes around Ali Shamkhani will affect future developments

remains to be seen. Undoubtedly, many actors within the regime have an interest in at least improving the historically bad relations with Saudi Arabia. As early as April this year, Foreign Minister Amir-Abdollahian was firmly involved in the dialogue with the Saudis (Orr & Yaakoubi, 2023).



Picture: Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian and his Saudi counterpart, Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud with Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang (Mehr News Agency CC 4.0)

The de-escalation between the bitter rivals Iran and Saudi Arabia is emblematic of a larger trend in the region right now: a feeling that after years of fighting, countries in the region want to move on towards settling conflicts and rebuilding at home. After the pandemic and the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, many nations in the Middle East have suffered shock after shock and are eager to get back some semblance of stability. The Saudis are interested in ending their entanglement in the war in Yemen in order

to create the sort of security that would attract foreign investment and allow them to forward with internal reforms and Vision 2030. Iran's economy has been suffering from years of sanctions by the international community and thus is seeking relief. Another example is Syria, which is being welcomed back in the Arab fold mainly because Gulf countries think the policy of isolation has failed and hope engaging will at least alleviate some problems related to the illicit drug trade and refugees.

The rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia seems to have few consequences for the Kingdom's relationship with Israel and observers still consider the possibility of a normalisation of relations to be quite possible (Enghusen, 2023). The Saudis continue to send signals that can be convincingly interpreted in the direction of further easing of tensions. According to Axios reports, Saudi Arabia made a commitment to UNESCO in mid-July to allow delegates from all member states, including Israel, to attend the upcoming World Heritage Committee meeting in Riyadh in September 2023. It would be the first time that representatives of an Israeli government officially set foot on Saudi soil (Ravid, 2023). For the time being, there seems to be no backsliding as a result of concessions to the Iranian regime. Possibly this is due to the business-oriented and pragmatic policy of Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman.

All this being said, it is safe to say that the Saudi-Iranian agreement has sent shockwaves through Washington D.C. and has made many realise that the "pariah policy" vis-à-vis the Saudis has and is causing major diplomatic damage. The lessons that Americans have drawn from this episode are three-fold: Firstly, Saudi-Iranian de-escalation is actually in line with the administration's regional strategy and America's hope to bring the war in Yemen to a close. The more worrisome component of this deal in the eyes of the US was China's involvement. Secondly, China is expanding its role in the region not only economically but also increasingly diplomatically. The long held assumption that China is a "security consumer" and enjoys free-riding on the US security architecture in the region is now being called into question. Thirdly, it has become clear that should the US withdraw (or

pivot) from the Middle East, the vacuum in this region, which has emerged as a major theatre of great power competition, will be filled by China.

China in the Middle East

In the last two decades, China has become one of the most important dynamic players in the Middle East. It actively engages with regional countries through two mechanisms: the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF). FOCAC, founded in 2000, convenes every three years and includes participation from all North African states. Meanwhile, CASCF, established in 2004, meets biennially and comprises all Arab League countries. The CASCF primarily addresses regional conflicts, with a particular focus on Arab-Israel peace, while also discussing other conflicts in Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. Beijing's principal objective in these forums is to showcase its political norms to regional countries. FOCAC and CASCF serve as platforms for China to repeatedly highlight the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" and "South-South Cooperation." Furthermore, the three concurrent summits held last December were effectively utilised to garner support for specific policies, both domestically and internationally. These policies included China's stance on Taiwan, its handling of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, and the promotion of its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (Silber, 2023).

Outwardly, the Chinese government appears open about its policies for the Middle East. China's Arab Policy Paper is a publicly available official document that outlines China's core concerns in the Arab region. The document suggests that China sees the Middle East as a key region in its global political ambitions. As one central addressee of the Chinese Arab policy,

the Arab League is named, to which explicit support is promised. The text is formulated in strikingly positive language and speaks of unity to be preserved, joint peaceful development and cooperation at all levels. The strategy summarises the political goals primarily in terms of comprehensive cooperation at the economic level, from trade to technology, culture to medicine. Here, the Belt and Road Initiative occupies a central position. Explicit commitment is made to the five principles of China's foreign policy: mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and cooperation for mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence (State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2016). It must be borne in mind that this is a programme deliberately formulated for the public, and that these aspects have to be read under the sceptical awareness of China's aspirations to become the leading world power. Observers note an increase in military presence, especially in the form of naval forces, in the Middle East as well as investments in critical infrastructure highly relevant to the West, such as the port of Haifa, Basra

and Umm Qasr (Rumley, 2022, p.7-9). The Belt and Road Initiative has long been criticised as a neo-imperialist instrument that forces developing countries in particular into a new dependency (Kleven, 2019).

China's Arab Policy Paper also contains a commitment to the necessity of the state existence of Palestine with East Jerusalem as its capital. In this context, China explicitly supports the Arab League. China claims it is committed to a peaceful solution of the Middle East conflict with a WMD-free zone in the region, but conspicuously the document does not mention the State of Israel by name (State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2016). In practice, China has consistently presented proposals on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since the 1991 Madrid Conference. Over the years, they have released multiple versions of these proposals following periods of heightened tension. The core elements of these proposals remain the same: advocating for a two-state solution with 1967 borders and East Jerusalem as the Palestinian capital, ending Israeli settlement expansion, and promoting international efforts for peace and cooperation between the two sides. China has also been

actively involved in the issue through a "special envoy on the Middle East" and hosting the Palestine-Israel Peace Symposium multiple times. However, despite these expressions of support, China has not taken concrete steps to advance the peace process. While Beijing's engagement with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict demonstrates continued interest, its proposals have not led to significant progress or resolutions. The resolutions reached during diplomatic efforts have been nonbinding, and despite hosting meetings between Israeli and Palestinian representatives, achieving tangible results has proven challenging. China's involvement seems to centre on expressing support and facilitating dialogue, rather than actively driving substantive solutions to the longstanding conflict (Silber, 2023).


China's approach to the Syrian civil war involved backing the Arab League and UN's six-point peace plan, along with presenting its own proposals at different times. Each proposal emphasised respecting Syrian sovereignty and territorial integrity, supporting reconstruction efforts, combating terrorism, and endorsing an inclusive political transition or conflict resolution. To facilitate its involvement, China assigned Xie Xiaoyan as a "special envoy for Syria," who has held the position since 2016. However, despite these initiatives, China has achieved limited tangible results. In the early years of the

war, its emphasis on "non-interference" caused tensions among CASC members. Many Arab governments objected to Beijing's stance, which claimed that UN Security Council resolutions on Syria undermined principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Consequently, China's engagement in the Syrian conflict has encountered challenges, and its initiatives seem to have had little significant impact so far (Silber, 2023). Yet there are some important developments. Syria made steps towards joining the Belt and Road Initiative in 2022, taking a first vital step out of

international isolation after the start of the civil war in 2011. Full membership would open a perspective for China to virtually re-create the historic Silk Road. Observers assume that this will further increase Chinese access to energy resources in the Middle East. It may also open the door for investment in the reconstruction of the war-torn country (Siddiqi, 2022). A

Given the long-term implications of an America less committed to supporting and upholding the regional security architecture, and given that many countries in the region depend on the US for their defence, countries in the Middle East have begun adapting and making significant changes to their security and foreign policy.

similar approach is already known from Chinese investments in infrastructure and development on the African continent. In this context, critics repeatedly point out that states are forced into dependency. But the Chinese policy in the MENA region can also provide positive effects for China at other levels. For example, in 2020, in addition to Syria, numerous states of the Arab League also supported the Hong Kong national security law in the United Nations Human Rights Council (Lawler, 2020).



World map: Numerous states in the Middle East region, including war-torn Syria, have already signed Belt and Road Initiative cooperation documents (by Owenson, Wikimedia CC 4.0)

Conclusion

Important changes are afoot in the Middle East that are worth noticing and understanding. This article has suggested that in a reality in which the US is withdrawing (or at least perceived to withdraw) from the region, players inside and outside it are making moves in order to better position themselves in a multipolar world characterised by great-power competition. The Abraham Accords were a direct result of moderate Arab nations feeling threatened by Iran's regional aggression and fearing a US withdrawal from the region, which is why they were looking for new partnerships and found a willing and capable partner in Israel. The Saudi-Iran détente also fits into this picture, as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia at some point during the Trump administration concluded that the US would not help defend it when push came to shove, and thus began to engage with Teheran in order to find a modus vivendi. Iran, for personal,

economic and strategic reasons, had a similar interest to engage Saudi Arabia. As mentioned, this is part of a larger trend in the region after the fallout of the pandemic and the war in Ukraine (and the Arab Spring before that), which have disrupted regional economies and after which nations in the region are looking to rebuild strength rather than pick new fights. In this new reality, China has taken on an increasingly crucial role: not only has it become the largest trading partner of many of the Gulf countries, it is also viewed as an impartial interlocutor in regional conflicts and thus able to play a bigger role in the politics of the region. In this multipolar world, Middle Eastern nations are hedging their bets and trying to have the best of both worlds: strong security relations with the US while maintaining economic freedom of action with China. However, as the competition between China and the US intensifies, only time will tell if this can be a sustainable model for the future.

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Unravelling System: Economic securitisation and a new economic Cold War

This article was reviewed by Bartłomiej Kupiec



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The EU's new economic security strategy (European Commission, 2023) which aims to reduce security risks across supply chains, critical infrastructure and technological shifts heralds an acknowledgement by the EU of the need to secure its economic supply chain. Trade disputes, technological arms race, weaponization of financial interdependence and the spectre of economic warfare. No, this is not the 1920s, it is the 2020s. The global economic order is undergoing a series of overlapping shocks that are being accelerated by the post-COVID-19 world and Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Decades of imbalances in economic development between and within nations have created resentment that has propelled anti-globalist views that normalised them. This exacerbates the rhetoric of economic decoupling and the securitisation of the global economy. Something uniquely, even the US President Joe Biden is pursuing. Therefore, it is vital to analyse the rationale of securitisation of the global economic order and its historical and geopolitical context. Following this, the paper looks at the trends of that securitisation in three areas: (i) Trade; (ii) International Finances; and (iii) Technology. Geopolitical and historical motives are accelerating the securitisation of the global economic order in trade, finance and technology. It brings with it distributional consequences of the Global North and the South, challenges and opportunities.

Global economic order

The global economic order can be defined as the dominant series of norms and institutions that govern and regulate interstate economic relations and regimes. The post-Cold War saw the so-called Washington

Consensus as the dominant order that regulated the global economic regimes through the combination of neoliberal and globalisation ideas, the supremacy of the US Dollar and the Bretton Woods institutions that govern the rules. This era took the ideas of free trade, open economies and the triumph of mainstream economic ideas (neoliberalism) as gospel. These ideas were credited with spurring economic growth across developing countries, as well as fostering global economic interdependence between countries. If Keynes extolled the virtues of free trade on the modern conveniences of cosmopolitan consumption, we lived in an age where a phone signal allows us to communicate 16,000 kilometres away, we can access freshly caught Norwegian salmon from the conveniences of a Japanese *minka* in Hokkaido by communicating in an iPhone that has components from 43 countries.

Beneath the triumphs, however, were cracks. Globalisation and trade liberalisation de-industrialised the rust belts of the once industrialised Global North but also Global South (propelled by the accession of China into the WTO). The shock therapy that Global South countries were compelled to implement by the Bretton Woods institutions undermined the socioeconomic livelihood of these increasingly impoverished countries. For good reason, unemployed industrial workers and an increasing austere financialised welfare state breed resentment towards the order. The consensus was eroding its legitimacy. It took the past decade since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis that oversaw crisis after crisis inflicting the global economy that delegitimised the consensus. The subsequent ideological imposition of austerity measures yet perpet-

uates sluggish economic recovery. The optimism of the 21st century gave way to disillusionment as global development falters (Oks & Williams, 2023). Where economic governance was perceived as a de-politicised and technocratic domain, this disillusionment has fuelled the re-politicisation of economic governance and its subsequent securitisation. Geopolitical factors exacerbate this process.

Bretton Woods Institutions:

International institutions set up at the end of the Second World War to coordinate and manage global economic issues from monetary policy to international trade and development. Today, they consist of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation. Not to be confused with the Bretton Woods system, which refers to a regime of monetary management whereby the US dollar ensures convertibility to gold until the 1970s.

While the Russian invasion shocked the global order into a crisis, multiple trends were already feeding the process of global economic fragmentation. An increasing assertive People's Republic of China poses new challenges to the global economic order. China has emerged into an economic powerhouse, a workshop of the world, where it is at the centre of some of the world's most strategic supply value chain. Its increasing assertiveness increasingly erodes the political economic security of the region and of the US. This is compounded by the increasing tensions over the Taiwan Straits and the South China Sea. As such, the US Presidents Trump and Biden have been fragmenting the global economy through a

policy mix that aims to derisk and decouple the global supply chain from China. The strategic competition spills over into technological competition. The past year has seen the securitisation of technology and of economic supply chain. The agenda of green transformation, digitalisation, artificial intelligence and military advances require technology and raw materials that are becoming bargaining chips. Hence, new coalitions or unilateral factions are forming in order to guard, secure and advance key technologies.

Goeconomics and Economic Securitisation

Increasing economic securitisation necessitates an understanding of goeconomics. Goeconomics is "the use of economic instruments to pursue or defend state interests, and to pursue beneficial geopolitical results; and the effects of others' economic actions on a country's geopolitical goal" (Blackwill & Harris, 2016). Economics becomes part of a country's geopolitical calculus, exercising economic power to influence other states and the geopolitical landscape. This is by utilising economic power as a geopolitical heft to enable enticement and coercion, favouring countries with larger economic leverage (Hirschmann, 1944). A relevant example of goeconomics is China's *Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)*. While it can be seen as a continuation of a series of development and infrastructure investment by China, the surrounding rhetoric as well as the strategic nature of some of the investments can enhance and strengthen its influence in the regions involved. Large infrastructure projects encompass transportation linkages such as ports and railways and energy infrastructures like power plants and transmis-

sion lines, giving China access to project its power abroad (Wooley et al., 2023). They also enhance economic relations such as trade and investment between participating countries and China, thus muting criticisms that it would otherwise be criticised. Goeconomics involves economic statecraft that encompasses trade and investment policies, development financing and economic sanctions.

Economic securitisation recognises the necessity of elevating economic dimensions as elements of foreign and security policymaking. This comes as economics affects security from financing both threats and security, and mobilising the resources needed to pursue and defend security. From this, it can be seen as an analytical subset of goeconomics. Economic securitisation assumes geopolitical importance as economic issues and challenges are framed in national security terms, which justifies goeconomic measures and responses in pursuit of geopolitical goals. Where goeconomics is the strategic instrumentalization of economic statecraft, economic securitisation provides the rationale. Crucially, economic securitisation recognises the interlinkages of economics with security by identifying the nexus of economic activities and resources that can strengthen or undermine national security. In today's technological competition, this is underlined by concerns of dual civil-military applications of technology and the control of strategic resources.

Since the Second World War, economics as a policy sphere have evolved into a technocratic one, where expertise and discourse have become depoliticised in favour of econometric theorems to be proven. This new era of globalisation presumes that greater international economic interdependence

fosters peace. This intellectual presumption is informed by older ideas of liberalism like commercial liberalism which emphasizes free trade and interdependent markets, democratic peace theory, and most recently, liberal institutionalism (Doyle M. W., 1986). The so-called mercantile peace theory or in Germany *Wandel durch Handel (change through trade)*, envisions that an order where international trade enables exchange of goods, people and ideas where interdependence makes conflict becomes inconceivable. This durable peace is borne out of greater interstate cooperation as well as of the introduction of a rule-based system that regulates interstate relations. Here, international institutions such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) provide the stable mechanism of dispute resolutions, development financing, and state financial and monetary aid.

The Russian invasion and tensions in the Indo-Pacific has revealed that interdependence can be weaponised. This insecurity stems from the fear of weaponised interdependence. Weaponized interdependence refers to "a condition under which an actor can exploit its position in an embedded network to gain a bargaining advantage over others in a contained system" (Drezner, et al., 2021). International actors with political authority over central economic nodes "can weaponize networks to gather information or choke off economic and information flows, discover and exploit vulnerabilities, compel policy change, and deter unwanted actions". A relevant illustration were the EU responses towards Russia's invasion of Ukraine. European dependence on Russia for energy security limited its diplomatic manoeuvrability at a critical point when it must act decisively against the invasion. While the EU has coordinated to

impose severe sanctions on Russia with price caps on oil, there was no ban on Russian oil products until February 2023 but even then, Russian gas continues to supply the EU even as it is weaning itself from that. Reciprocally, the sanctions on Russia restricted its access to advanced technology and critical raw materials, hobbling its war efforts as it scrambles to look for alternatives. Weaponised interdependence is not an end to itself, but can disrupt adversaries and limit strategic manoeuvrability.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has exposed the vulnerabilities of economic interdependence, exacerbating underlying contentions within the global economy. Today's geoeconomics competition revolves around the securitisation of two areas:



(i) International Financing

International finance consists of the constant flow of money and capital that lubricates the global economy. The access to global financial liquidity supports the ability of states to participate in the global economy, from its exchange rates and trade flows to the access to investment and technology. This is one ingredient that supports global development, especially in the Global South. Propping up international finances are three aspects: the Bretton Woods institutions of the WTO, World Bank and the IMF; the US dollar dominance;

and the interconnected network of financial institutions. However, there exists resentment against this financial order, especially on the first two. This is changing the geoeconomics' calculus of countries like the US and China.

The current financial order is perceived as pro-Transatlantic. The Bretton Woods institutions were established in a time before post-colonial states gained independence. Representations within these institutions remain dominated by the West – the IMF is always headed by a European and has a US veto – while there is lack of inclusivity for the Global South, especially with regard to their perspectives. This has regressive consequences for many poor countries, as the repeated application of *shock therapy* impoverished poor countries. The external imposition of austerity produced sluggish economic growth, low productivity and welfare, inducing resentment against what they perceive as neocolonialism. The legitimacy of the global financial system is further eroded as shock therapy continues to be imposed even as the perception that global development has failed (Oks & Williams, 2023). Whereas debt traps poor countries into a vicious cycle from high interest rates. There is no surprise that there is no love lost by the Global South towards the global economic institutions.

Thus, emerges alternative visions of international financial order, in which the most prominent example is China (Wigglesworth & Sun Yu, 2023). China has emerged as the lender of last resort that is challenging the incumbent US-dominated IMF (Rajvanshi, 2023), it is also now the world's largest bilateral creditor. China offers a mix of traditional development aid financing, infrastructural funding and capital goods (Chin & Gallagher, 2019). It deploys state-owned banks to fund infrastruc-

ture and development projects, often under the banner of the BRI. It established the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as an alternative international development bank to the World Bank. What also distinguishes China from the Bretton Woods is the ease of access to Chinese financing, it imposes less onerous conditions than the IMF and is more ambivalent to liberal indicators of institutional reforms. Nonetheless, the decentralised nature of Chinese financing opens criticism to its opacity, loose conditions, flexibility and even existence. But the weight of Chinese financing enables it to undermine the development aid regime, as in Zambia, where its IMF deal hinges on Chinese debt restructuring (Corbet, 2023), or in Argentina, where the yuan forestalled Argentina from defaulting on its IMF loans (Rosario & Strohecker, 2023).

The rise of two competing financing architectures provides risks and opportunities. It affords poor countries more space to critique the US-led lending complex and enables them to pressure for better lending conditions by playing both architectures. This can force the west to review its fiscal and financing constraints that it imposes on poor countries. However, the risk is that countries will be bifurcated between two competing architectures with two complementary and competing spheres of operations. Sovereign debt financing becomes just another geopolitical instrument by both sides that risks deepening the debt crisis in poor countries.

Another aspect of the international financial order is the US dollar dominance. The denomination of global flows of money and capital in the US dollar makes the US the global financial superpower. There is simply no precedent in the power of the US dollar as the global reserve currency (Siripurapu &

Berman, 2023). The importance of dollar liquidity in lubricating trade and capital flows can be illustrated in the 2008 and COVID-19 economic crises, when the Federal Reserve established currency swap lines with major central banks to provide dollar liquidity. Thus, the structural power of the US over the financial network enables it to uniquely weaponise the international financial system's dollar dependency through economic sanctions. The US government can restrict access to the US financial system via sanctions, thereby cutting off actors from the international financial system. Non-American actors with no ties to the US will find themselves sanctioned by virtue of using the US dollar to access the global market. Even after the Cold War and amidst globalisation, economic sanctions remain the most visible aspect of weaponizing interdependence.

However, over weaponising financial interdependence risks eroding the US's soft power. While it will be difficult to fragment and wean away from the dollar system because of its embeddedness in the global economy, it forces adversarial actors to work hard to undermine the Achilles' heel of the US's other economic interdependence such as trade and industrial capacity. There is also no guarantee that economic sanctions achieve the desired outcomes. Economic sanctions work on the assumptions that (Mulder, 2022):

- There is multilateral legitimacy.
- States with no outsized influence on the global economy.
- As a deterrent, not an instrument of conflict. War prevention, not war containing.
- Monopoly over critical resources, which can be denied to sanctioned countries.
- Sanctions create a resentful populace that constrains the regime's belligerency.

Hence, it is difficult to apply the above assumptions on countries like China because of its outsized economy and its control over crucial raw materials such as rare earth metals.




Figure 1: East Asia dominates semiconductor manufacturing (from Miller, 2022)

(ii) Trade and industrial policy

Rhetorical resentment over high trade deficits and deindustrialisation since the Trump Presidency has evolved into trade conflicts. Decades of de-industrialisation raise concerns of national industrial capacity as Transatlantic partners scramble to supply Ukraine with weapons while expanding its military stocks in the context

of rising tensions with China (der Colff, 2023). In addition, renewed trade wars are disrupting the global value chain as contestation over technology access such as semiconductors ensue tit-for-tat trade restrictions. This also illustrated the breaking down of international trade rules as the WTO becomes impotent in arbitrating disputes between major economies. The maxim that free trade produces durable peace has proved illusory.

At the centre is China, which has emerged as an industrial powerhouse despite slow growth and structural problems within the Chinese economy (The Economist, 2023). It has emerged as a global producer of green technology – from photovoltaic cells and nuclear power stations to windmills. Even Germany, the EU's economic powerhouse, is losing its automobile market share to China. The US and China have set their sights on the latest technological competition – semiconductors, which its dual civil-military use is strategic in securing dominance over supercomputers, artificial intelligence and even quantum computing (Miller, 2022). The semiconductor industry remains overwhelmingly based in East Asia as shown in Figure 1. The new phase of geoeconomic competition is in technology, where trade policies pursue technological advantage while denying their adversary access.

The bellicose rhetoric of China towards Taiwan compels the US to pursue a series of industrial strategies to rebuild its manufacturing capacity. US industrial strategy in the form of so-called supply-side progressivism, where a wide range of government initiatives are aimed at strengthening market capacities in targeted sectors (Vassallo, 2023). Key to its agenda are two legisla-

tive packages: the CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). The CHIPS Act provides \$280 billion in funding to research and manufacture semiconductors and represents more blatant use of industrial strategy. There is evidence that the act is crowding in investment, as a spat of international technological companies has begun committing to investing in new facilities in the US. The industrial policies under the CHIPS Act and the IRA exemplify how much economic policymaking has been securitised. The acts that encompass climate, green, labour and industrial policies survive US partisan politics by being framed as directed against Chinese competition. Though, the crowding-in of foreign investment means that technological companies in Asia and Europe are diverting their investments to the US, to their detriment. In the face of the EU and China complaining of the US's unfair trade practice of subsidies, the US justifies those subsidies as necessary for national security.

Moreover, the US is on an offensive to deny technological advantage in semiconductors to China. The US government continues to hold the intellectual property rights to some of the most basic and advanced components of semiconductors. Hence, it has the power to provide and restrict access to those technologies that are being produced in Taiwan and the Netherlands. The US did just that with regard to the EUV lithography machine tools produced by ASML in the Netherlands, as well as 5 nanometres chips produced in Taiwan. While the impact this has on China's semiconductor industry remains to be seen, this is a significant step of weaponizing interdependence within the semiconductor value chain.

China has since responded in kind. It is pursuing an industrial policy to modernise its industry with the *Made in China 2025* initiative. In addition to incentives provided to Chinese firms to replicate its western and Taiwanese rivals, China retaliates with export restrictions on important rare earth metals such as germanium and gallium that are crucial for doping the chips. This illustrates the US's vulnerability to weaponised interdependence, just as China is. This is just one example of China's ability to weaponise resource interdependence, as China also dominates the world's critical minerals in both extraction and refining (Figure 2).




Figure 2: China dominates mineral refining and mining.

As the US and China are locked in a trade dispute, the WTO has proved itself inept in resolving disputes between both countries. The WTO appellate body has been rendered dysfunctional by the US's vetoing the appointment of the body's judges. In response, EU and Canada have founded the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement as an alternative provisional system for resolving WTO disputes (DG Trade, 2023). However, this is a provisional arrangement, if the WTO continues to be hobbled by Sino-US trade disputes, its in-

fluence and the international trade regime will continue to be eroded.

Crisis and opportunities

This article has so far described the current affairs of geoeconomics and economic securitisation and how global economic order is being fragmented. Nevertheless, past conflicts have shown that far from destroying the pre-war economic system and collapsing the system of international trade and investment, conflicts violently redistribute power within the global economic system (Tooze, 2014). The trends we are seeing are symptoms of that redistribution.

Insofar, this article has been framed with reference to geoeconomics competition between the US and China, but that does not mean other countries will not be equally influential in setting the terms of geopolitical outlook. The global economic order is becoming more multipolar as new middle power states are being elevated into the global stage. Middle powers are state actors that can swing the power balance of a geopolitical competition. They are increasingly playing pivotal but ambivalent roles in international affairs, inducing new patterns of international cooperation and multilateral alignment in security, economics and global order. Middle powers are often regional powers with an outsized influence beyond their region, have large shares within the global economy and carry influences in a variety of issues within international affairs. They can be as diverse as established powers such as the EU, Germany and Japan, rising powers such as Iran and South Korea, and swing states such as Brazil, India, Indonesia and Turkey (German Marshall Fund, 2023).

This new multipolarity unveils new opportunities to shape the patterns of the global economic order, as ambitious and often assertive middle powers seek to craft a larger voice in international affairs. Middle powers can become power brokers to reshape the global economic order into one that is less western dominated and more equitable. To achieve this, middle powers will have to cultivate new partnerships and form like-minded principles and interests to shape those patterns. However, this also risks fracturing the fragile global order in regard to security and economics as illustrated in Syria and Yemen, where the involvement of multiple middle powers like Saudi Arabia, Iran, Israel and Turkey are destabilising the region. A fragmented economic order into various blocs will make the global trading and capital regime unreliable. Decoupling international trade risks fracturing the global supply chain in food, building materials, production and technology, affecting the livelihoods of millions.

For the EU, it is still an ongoing debate whether the EU would have to make a choice between pursuing a strategy that aligns with US goals, thus antagonising China; or pursuing strategic autonomy, which it must keep a distance from Sino-US rivalry. As it stands, the EU is formulating a strategy of 'de-risking' – which is, to reduce the risks associated with overdependence on 'unfriendly' or hostile countries. This is perceived as a softer stance from economic decoupling from China as encouraged by the US (von der Leyen, 2023). The 30 June 2023 conclusions of the European Council also indicates de-risking as the EU's position vis-à-vis China. It frames its relationship with China as a "strategic rival".

While recognising the necessity of China as a strategic partner in various economic cooperation. Simultaneously, the EU is beset by the US's IRA, which is undermining its industrial economy and threatens to trigger a trade conflict. Since COVID-19, the EU has attempted a provisional common fiscal policy under Next Generation EU, and new industrial strategy such as the Green Deal and the European Chips Act. With the European Critical Raw Materials Act, it is diversifying its supply of raw materials beyond a few states. Moreover, the EU's latest economic security strategy attempts to defend the EU's economic base and competitiveness from external risks. However, the EU remains inchoate in its positioning because of various member states' interests and the lack of a common fiscal framework to coordinate resources. The next decade will be crucial in clarifying the EU's alignment and in deepening its policy tools (Gehrke, 2023).

With complex interdependence being weaponised, no state actors can act unilaterally (not even the US or China). They have to foster new interdependencies and partnerships with like-minded countries: established powers with middle powers or amongst middle powers. This involves efforts to gather a coalition of partners to mobilise and coordinate them to confront adversaries. The Russo-Ukrainian War has

accelerated this trend of unilateralism as a small group of states partners up to confront an overlapping set of geopolitical and economic challenges. They are tangential in recruiting and involving the rising middle-power states into regional geopolitical positions. It remains a challenge to build new coalitions and new economic blocs to shift geoeconomic order.

Conclusion

While scholars continue to fret about the fragmentation of the global economic order, the global economy remains as interdependent as ever. New and continued challenges such as the climate crisis, imperialist wars and trade interdependence show that no country is an island. Confronting these challenges require galvanising resources at a global level and coordinating between actors.

The ongoing fragmentation will continue to impose costs and hobble responses to the challenges of the day. Nevertheless, global economic fragmentation helps expose disagreements, inequalities and problems and reveal the nature of the global economy order of the past century. This creates opportunities for redistributing power within the global economic order and reform it. That will require small and middle power actors to cooperate, navigating between the bifurcating powers.

[Global economic fragmentation] creates opportunities for redistributing power within the global economic order and reform it.

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
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From Hermit Kingdom to Queendom: Kim Jong-un's Daughter and Her Role in North Korean Politics

This article was reviewed by Yaron Lischinsky



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North Korea's successful launch of a Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), capable of striking the continental United States, has made headlines all over the world. The reason for this, however, was not the rocket itself. Rather, it was the sight of the country's leader, Kim Jong-un, walking hand in hand with his daughter that caught worldwide attention. Ever since, observers have been discussing the rationale behind introducing the young girl to the public. Some argue that through her display, the regime intends to project an image of humanity and innocence upon itself. Others speculate that she is being positioned as a potential heiress to her father. However, is it really possible to predict whether she will assume the leadership post?

Her public appearances should not be viewed in isolation. Rumours and reports sur-

rounding Kim Jong-un's deteriorating health have evoked a climate of uncertainty about the future of the regime (Shim, 2023). A struggle for power should Kim Jong-un no longer be able to lead the country could have far-reaching implications for security dynamics in Northeast Asia. Yet, considering her age and her lack of political experience, the odds of her being groomed as an imminent successor to her father are rather low. Instead, another, less strict assumption may prove to be stronger in explaining her frequent displays: her public appearances indicate that Kim Jong-un will eventually be succeeded by *someone* from within the Kim family dynasty, regardless of whether it will be his daughter or someone else. Thus, in light of Kim Jong-un's reportedly poor state of health, his daughter's frequent showcases first and foremost serve as strategic manoeuvres intended to signal the regime's durability.



Figure 1: Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP

In order to explain this theory, this text will first introduce the benefits of hereditary succession, considering that this is the mechanism that regulates leadership transition in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). It will then examine the domestic political environment in North Korea to prove that the signal Kim tries to send is indeed credible. Although dominated by men, the number of women in North Korean domestic politics has risen steadily ever since Kim Jong-un took the country's helm. If this trend persists, it could ultimately pave the way for a female leader. This text will conclude by drawing out Kim Jong-il's rise to power to identify patterns that may help assess the prospects of Kim Jong-un's daughter being groomed as the DPRK's next leader.

Why Autocratic Regimes Like Hereditary Succession

The majority of experts agree that North Korea practises hereditary succession, where power solely lies in the hands of the Kim dynasty (Jo, 1986; Park, 2011; Zhe, 2015). The country's constitution declares the DPRK the "State of Juche," which applies the ideas of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il (*Socialist Constitution of The Democratic People's Republic of Korea*, 2020, p. 1). The "Ten Principles for the Establishment of a Monolithic Ideological System", arguably of higher significance than the constitution, moreover herald the first two leaders as the "Sun of Juche" (Dowling & Hong, 2021) and demand unconditional obedience to them. Finally, all three leaders so far have been members of the Kim family.

Hereditary succession offers several advantages for autocratic regimes. First, it provides clear rules for the process of power transition. If leadership succession is disputed, instability arises, and elites may be incentivised to carry

out a coup. By regulating succession, dictators prevent the emergence of a power vacuum that could destabilise their rule (Brownlee, 2007; Herz, 1952; Kokkonen & Sundell, 2014; Svolik, 2012; Tullock, 1987). The void left behind by Mao Zedong's death in 1976 illustrates that unregulated succession can pose a significant threat. Initially, Mao sought to balance competing factions within the Communist Party to consolidate his leadership. After his passing, however, a power struggle between the different factions ensued, resulting in political turmoil and instability (Dittmer, 1994). Establishing clear principles guiding the transfer of power may have prevented such a threat. Kokkonen and Sundell (2014) further suggest that autocratic rulers in mediaeval Europe were less likely to be deposed if they practised hereditary succession. That is, because primogeniture, i.e. the transfer of governing authority to the first-born child, signals the longevity of the regime, thus vetting the ruler against internal threats (Kokkonen & Sundell, 2020).

Second, by nature of their position, designated successors accrue power, which may incentivise them to accelerate the power transition process by mounting a coup against the incumbent leader. This is generally referred to as the "crown prince problem" (Herz, 1952). However, if the designated successor is an offspring of the incumbent leader, they may be more loyal to their parent and thereby less inclined to forcibly seize power. Against this backdrop, Brownlee (2007) argues that hereditary succession makes for a viable solution to the crown prince problem since the threat of regime overthrow orchestrated by descendants of the incumbent leader is lower.

Third, hereditary succession incentivises elites to maintain support for the leadership by rendering political dynamics an iterated game.

Elites receive their positions and privileges as a result of the current distribution of power. In order to safeguard these in the long term, they have to preserve existing power structures. In other words, elites who wish to remain part of the elite have strong incentives to maintain support for the incumbent leadership. If a regime can demonstrate a long-term perspective, there is little rationale for withdrawing support. Hereditary succession serves as a means for autocratic rulers to demonstrate such a long-term perspective, as it acts as a signal of the regime's longevity and stability (Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2000; Park, 2011).

In light of his poor health condition, Kim Jong-un may seek to communicate the longevity of his regime even beyond his rule. Under these circumstances, hereditary succession is an attractive tool as it discourages internal power struggles and signals the continuity of benefit distribution. This way, it may help stabilise his rule and ensure a smooth power of transfer in case this is necessitated by his health situation.

The Kim Dynasty: Ever since the Korean War, control over the Northern part of the Korean peninsula was kept in the hands of the Kim family. From the DPRK's founding father Kim Il-sung and his son Kim Jong-il to Kim Jong-un's present leadership, their legacy is interwoven with the country's complex history and its role in global politics.

Women on the Rise in North Korean Politics

Yet, it may seem unrealistic at first glance that a woman could ultimately emerge as the beneficiary of such a power transfer. North

Korea's society is traditionally extremely patriarchal. Gender roles are clearly distributed, and politics is considered a male domain. "남존여비" (namjon yeobi) is a traditional Confucian term that connotes conventional gender roles and attitudes. Translating to "male superiority and female inferiority," it promotes strict hierarchical relationships as well as the subordination of women to men. Considering the historical prevalence of this concept in North Korean society, the only woman to attain a somewhat powerful position until Kim Jong-un assumed leadership was Kim Il-sung's second wife, Kim Song-ae, who became the head of the Woman's Union in 1960 (Lankov, 2023).

Although discrimination against women persists, the situation has changed dramatically since Kim Jong-un assumed leadership. The onset of marketisation significantly elevated the role of women in the country. The state tacitly accepting the presence of these markets further reinforced the new status of women in the DPRK (Charley, 2023; Cho et al., 2020; Park, 2012). In the 2019 Supreme People's Assembly elections, nearly one in five politicians elected was female. Remarkably, as portrayed in Figure 2, the percentage of women in North Korea's Supreme People's Assembly is substantially higher than that of Japan and undercuts the share of women in South Korea's parliament by merely 1.5 % (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.). Additionally, there has been a notable increase in the number of women holding senior government positions in recent years. Kim Yo-jong, the sister of Kim Jong-un, has emerged as a prominent figure and is believed to currently hold the position of First Deputy Director of the Workers' Party's Propaganda and Agitation Department. She is widely regarded as a close advisor to her




Figure 2: Share of women in international parliaments

brother. Other notable female figures in the DPRK's government include Choe Son-hui, who acted as an important negotiator in denuclearisation talks with the United States and was appointed as foreign minister in 2022, and Hyon Song-wol, former leader of the agitprop band Morangbong, now in a leading position in the ruling party's Propaganda and Agitation Department (Noh, 2020).

The appointments of women to senior positions indicate a paradigm shift in North Korea's traditionally male-dominated political landscape. This could have profound implications for the future of the leader's daughter: Although powerful women remain a rare sight in the upper tiers of the government apparatus, recent developments have provided increased legitimacy for women who aspire to assume positions of power. This not only benefits regime

stability but could ultimately also enable a female leader. On a side note: albeit rare, women in power are not entirely unheard of in other socialist regimes. In Vietnam, for example, Nguyễn Thị Kim Ngân has previously served as Chair of the National Assembly, a position considered one of the four pillars of leadership. And in the incumbent Politburo of the Communist Party, Trương Thị Mai serves as a permanent member of the Secretariat.

A potential obstacle to the rise of women may be the dominance of hardliners in North Korean domestic politics, a faction almost exclusively composed of men (Park, 2011; Schäfer, 2021). The country's patriarchal structure perpetuates traditional gender roles that may hinder women from ascending to positions of power. With respect to this, it is notable that most public appearances of Kim Jong-un's daughter so far

have taken place in a military context, a domain of the hardline faction. The young girl has prominently accompanied her father to multiple ICBM launches, attended a military parade, and joined a banquet with military officials. The stamps she is featured on moreover depict her in front of a mobile missile launcher and showcase her together with high-ranking military members (North Korea Leadership Watch, n.d.; Harrison et al., 2023; Reddy, 2023). Her appearances may thus serve as a means to introduce her to the military elite of the country and to improve their acceptance of a powerful female figure.

Inspiration from Textbook Power Transition

The fate of Kim Jong-un's older brother, Kim Jong-nam, opens another avenue of explanation for the repeated public appearances of the current leader's daughter. Being the oldest son of former ruler Kim Jong-il, it was originally him who was poised to be the country's next leader, but he fell out of his father's favour after getting caught with a forged passport when he tried to visit Disneyland in Tokyo in 2001. The fallout was perhaps inevitable as, according to personal statements, Kim Jong-nam advocated reforms and market-opening in the DPRK, which led to his father labelling him a capitalist. He was eventually exiled and continued to publicly criticise the regime, in particular its dynastic succession system ("Kim Jong-Nam Says N. Korean Regime Won't Last Long," 2012).

Kim Jong-un may try to prevent his daughter from following a similar path. Having attended schools in Russia and Switzerland, young Kim Jong-nam enjoyed freedoms absent in the DPRK. Pyongyang was far away, control was lax, and content that may be perceived as malicious by the leadership was readily available.

These factors may have contributed to his growing criticism of his father's regime. The proximity between Kim Jong-un's daughter and the strong military faction of the leadership stands in stark contrast to Kim Jong-nam's childhood. Raising her in the heart of the state's power and accompanying her father to important events helps prevent alienation from the regime and establishes a bond between her and the country's ruling class. This makes her more susceptible to a favourable view of the regime in the future.

It additionally increases the cost for her to oppose the regime. The personal relationships she may develop with powerful members of the country's elite will make her more reluctant to remove these people from their positions in case she attains a government post in the future. In contrast, Kim Jong-nam would possibly have had fewer qualms about dramatically changing the elite's composition, since he grew up in isolation from the ruling class and thus lacked close ties with its members. Finally, experiencing the regime's power dynamics may increase the young girl's understanding of who holds influence and who might resist attempts at reform. This decreases the risk of conflict in the future. Raising her in Pyongyang and showcasing her to the public is therefore a rational choice for the North Korean regime.

Combining these three perspectives yields a more comprehensive view of why the regime may showcase Kim Jong-un's daughter. Considering the poor state of Kim Jong-un's health situation, he is well advised to communicate to the elite that the regime remains stable. The image of stability that he constructs thus rests on three pillars. First, hereditary succession establishes clear rules of succession and signals continuity, and by presenting a possible heiress, he implies that rule will be passed down to the

dynasty's next generation in the upcoming instance of power transition. Second, an increasing number of women in powerful positions may pave the way for a female leader in the future. Third, by raising his daughter in Pyongyang, Kim Jong-un ensures that she develops a set of values in line with those of the DPRK. The exact extent of the current leader's health problems remains unknown, but the repeated appearances of his daughter and the implications associated with them indicate that a collapse of the regime is far from imminent.

How to find out who will become the DPRK's Next Leader

The question that remains to be answered is whether Kim Jong-un is grooming his daughter as the next leader of the DPRK. While this is not the main subject of this paper, several indicators may hint at the role the leader's daughter will assume in the future. These range from more favourable conditions for women in senior government positions in the DPRK to clues that may be drawn from the build-up process Kim Jong-il went through.

First, should the reign of the country be passed on, it is unlikely that power will be retained in the 3rd generation of the Kim dynasty. Kim Jong-un's brothers are dead or considered unsuitable for a leadership position, and it might yet be one generation too early to install a female leader ("Kim Jong-Nam Says N. Korean Regime Won't Last Long," 2012). On top of that, autocratic leaders nonetheless prefer to be succeeded by a descendant rather than a sibling, irrespective of the circumstances. Grooming a sibling gives rise to a powerful antagonist who may pose a threat to the incumbent leader in the build-up phase. Being part of

the same generation, the incumbent leader and a sibling successor recruit members of the same elite for their power bases, which may ultimately result in a struggle for power prior to the incumbent's passing. In order to solve this problem and ensure the stability of their rule, authoritarian leaders typically prefer to pass the reins of power down to a descendant (Kokkonen & Sundell, 2014).

A second factor supporting the view that Kim Jong-un's daughter is being groomed as a future leader is the fact that the political environment and recent developments no longer exclude women from politics. The increased presence of women in important positions, coupled with the observation that the girl's public appearances have so far predominantly taken place in male-dominated settings, implies that Kim Jong-un tries to create an environment that is more conducive to women in upper government positions. In summary, if the DPRK keeps following this trajectory, a female leader could be within the realm of possibility in the future.

In order to understand political manoeuvres involving Kim Jong-un's daughter and how they might be related to the question of succession, observers may draw lessons from the power transfer process from Kim Il-sung to Kim Jong-il. The power transition process administered by Kim Il-sung took 26 years, which allowed for thoroughly planning the rise of young Kim Jong-il and the eventual transfer of power. Kim Jong-un's ascendancy to power, on the other hand, proceeded much quicker. It only became apparent in 2010 that he was groomed as the regime's next leader, and his father's passing merely one year later possibly opened up the avenue to the country's leadership post quicker than he had anticipated (Frank, 2012). This means that Kim Jong-un had significantly less time to consolidate his power, which in

turn could potentially have posed a threat to the country's stability. Considering that North Korea's society remains strongly patriarchal, granting her a longer period of time to establish ties with powerful figures and build up a support base may be regarded as an investment in the regime's long-term stability, in case the young girl eventually ascends to the country's top post.

When Kim Il-sung passed power on to his son, he undertook several measures that tremendously supported Kim Jong-il's reign: among other factors, he centralised power, developed a personality cult centred on himself, and built up a loyal elite. These elements remain vital in contemporary North Korean politics. The state is still centred on the Kim family, and foundational documents could be adjusted in the future to include a fourth-generation Kim dynasty leader.

This, however, will likely only happen once a future leader is officially appointed. Until then, propaganda may most reliably indicate the significance of the incumbent leader's daughter. As her name has not yet been publicly announced, she is mostly described through honorary titles. Such titles could hint at her standing within the regime and thereby provide clues about the path she takes. Given the power the military holds in the DPRK and considering that military backing will be crucial for a future 4th generation leader, mil-

itary titles will be particularly significant.

Crucial will also be the posts to which she or another possible successor will be assigned. During his rise to power, Kim Jong-il held multiple positions in the party and the military. He served as Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army, as the Director of the Propaganda Bureau, and joined the Workers' Party's Political Commission, before becoming a member of the Politburo (Lim, 2012). He was additionally conferred honorary titles such as "party centre" and "beloved leader comrade", and saw his birthday designated a public holiday on his ascendancy to the helm of the country (Frank & Park, 2012). All in all, Kim Jong-il enjoyed a power incubation period (PIP) of 26 years during which he could consolidate his power and build up a loyal support base. Empirical evidence suggests in this context that re-

gimes with a PIP of more than five years tend to be more stable, and the case of Kim Jong-il is certainly a supporting example. Whether or not the young girl will replicate Kim Jong-il's path remains to be seen, particularly considering that it remains unlikely that a woman will assume a high-level military post. Yet, if one were to assume that Kim Jong-un's daughter will succeed her father in the future, it is not surprising that she appears on the political stage early, as it allows for more time to become familiar with incumbent elites.

Although powerful women remain a rare sight in the upper tiers of the government apparatus, recent developments have provided increased legitimacy for women who aspire to assume positions of power.

Conclusion

Will Kim Jong-un's daughter eventually ascend to power and continue the reign of the Kim dynasty? Or are there motives behind the frequent display of Kim Jong-un's daughter that remain hidden from observers? For now, it remains unclear whether the young girl will eventually rise to the country's leadership. But while it is too early to determine whether she will become the country's next leader, Kim Jong-un's reportedly poor health condition may necessitate political manoeuvres that signal the regime's stability.

In the DPRK, this is first and foremost achieved through the practise of hereditary succession. Maintaining a ruling dynasty provides clear rules of succession and thereby deters power struggles within the leadership. By signalling that there is a potential successor, Kim Jong-un communicates the continuity of the regime and thus the continuity of benefit distribution beyond his lifetime. Yet, given the young age of his daughter, it is impossible to tell for sure whether she will become the country's next leader. Rather, scholars should, for now, apply a less strict assumption: instead of assuming that she will ascend to power, a safer conclusion is to assume that *someone* will become the country's next leader, regardless of whether it will be Kim Jong-un's daughter or another individual. Who will assume power greatly depends on the severity of Kim Jong-un's health problems, and is also

subject to a power struggle that may arise in the event of his passing. However, it is difficult to tell when such a power struggle may break out, who might participate, and whom the different factions may support.

Considering Kim Jong-un's investments in regime stability, theories of a sudden collapse of the Kim regime may be rejected. The young girl's frequent displays indicate that, in fact, quite the opposite is the case: the regime is stable and will persist in the future. This has direct implications for the security environment surrounding North Korea: if there are no fundamental changes in the country's leadership, observers cannot expect fundamental changes in the DPRK's foreign policy. In line with its current military posture, the DPRK will likely maintain its trajectory of deterrence. This is furthermore particularly evident through the frequent connections made between the leader's daughter and the regime's military apparatus, as seen, for example, in the picture of her walking hand in hand with her father in front of an ICBM missile. Plus, after all, such weapon tests send both inward and outward signals that the country can defend itself - which is nothing more than an indication of its resilience, i.e., stability. Whether or not the girl assumes power is unclear, but grooming her is unlikely to be on Kim Jong-un's agenda for now. Showcasing the young girl is thus not about succession; it is about sending a message to the international audience.

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Anarchy and Institutions: A Question of Norms, Values, and the Understanding of the World

This article was reviewed by Maximilian Schußmüller



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Introduction

Institutions are built to foster prosperity and peace on the international stage by mitigating the effects of anarchy. But recent events in Syria and Ukraine show that institutions are not a guarantee for security, thus questioning if their proliferation will truly mitigate anarchy or if they only serve as tools for the powerful. To address this, this essay will embark on the endeavor to find the foundation at the heart of institutions and the implications that this search will have on the cooperation within existing institutions and on the formation of new ones. Therefore, it is vital to first discuss the concept of anarchy from different perspectives of international relations, settling on Alexander Wendt's (1992) argument, making anarchy a constructed phenomenon that can be altered and transformed. Following this, it is necessary to establish the nature of institutions and by moving beyond their physical form this paper will unearth their underlying foundation: values. But what are values, and how do they interact with each other on the international stage? By answering these questions from a cosmopolitan and postcolonial perspective, the tensions between international cooperation and national, or even local, identity will be highlighted, thus concluding that the creation of shared values is as vital as it is difficult for the creation of institutions and that their proliferation can contribute to the mitigation of anarchy, and even the change of that institution altogether.

Anarchy in International Relations

The concept of anarchy is constructed differently by competing theories of International Relations, resulting in different assessments of its impact on world politics, ranging from conflictual to cooperative. Anarchy in the context

of international relations refers to the absence of an overarching authority or sovereign and, thus, the absence of a monopoly on the use of force. While this concept in itself is clear and concise, its implications are widely different and strongly depend on the utilized theoretical approach. Realist theory, through its focus on states, their survival, and lack of trust (Jervis, 1978) views anarchy as the foundation for the primacy of hard power on the international stage since the survival of a state can only be guaranteed through its relative strength over others. Where realists differ is in the precise actions that cement or build a state's hegemonic status in the balance of power. Offensive realists argue that states will attempt to increase their power through expansionist gambits, therefore, creating a constant threat of attack by their competitors. Defensive realists, on the other hand, suggest that the state avoid most expansionist endeavors since the lack of trust can turn into violence that spirals out of control, thus they recommend policies of restraint (Taliaferro, 2001 pp. 128-129). Nonetheless, realist theory views cooperation in an anarchical context as difficult due to the lack of trust and fears that states will cheat to gain advantages (Mearsheimer, 1994 p. 13).

Liberalist theory on the other hand approaches anarchy from an angle of cooperation. Diverging from the realist perspective of conflictual selfish states, liberals argue that states cooperatively interact with each other since the resulting mutual gains are in their best self-interest (Keohane, 1984). This view is based on the fact that states frequently interact with one another and that this behavior, assessed through the prisoner's dilemma, is the most fruitful outcome of interstate relations since deception or cheating would constitute a barrier to future interaction with other states (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1984). This focus on cooperation then results in an increasingly

complex web of inter-state interactions through which states depend on one another in a phenomenon called complex interdependence (Keohane & Nye, 1973) further reducing the conflictual elements of anarchy under the gaze of liberal institutionalism making anarchy an issue of economic cooperation.

While realist and liberalist theories view anarchy as a given component of the international system with a complete set of rules that apply to all, constructivist theory instead follows the sociological path of intersubjectivity to emphasize that the actions of states do not purely follow rational behavior and the maximization of economic gains or security. At the core anarchy from a constructivist viewpoint is based on the identity of a state, thus arguing against the unified rational actor at the core of realist and liberalist theory, thus including peoples and their biases and views in the formation of an identity that then interacts with those formed by other nations leading to a fluent and ever-changing international environment where identities are formed and changed depending on those that interact with one another (Wendt, 1992). Furthermore, constructivism views the social world as a set of structures that create and confine human interaction but in contrast to the deterministic nature of realism, the constructed nature of the social world constitutes the opportunity to change structures and shape them according to our will (Hopf, 1998; Wendt, 1992), opening the door for understandings of anarchy that reach beyond a fight for survival or cooperation through economic interdependence.

Reflecting on these three approaches to anarchy, the constructivist approach contains clear advantages to the assessment of the issue at hand. Realist and liberalist theories view anarchy as a set constant in the international system akin to natural law, its human origin creates a dichotomy between this unmoving principle and the fluency

of human interactions and development. The focus of the constructivist perspective on the identity of actors and the constructed nature of the international order, on the other hand, lends itself to the assessment of institutions since it incorporates human dynamics into international structures. This lens allows for the dissection of institutions into their origins and foundations, while also aiding in the process of uncovering the challenges they face in their effort to mitigate anarchy. Lastly, in contrast to realism and liberalism, constructivism also offers a framework to glimpse beyond the concept of anarchy altogether, making it the ideal theory for this essay.

Anarchy in International Relations:
The absence of a singular authority with a monopoly on the use of force on the international stage. Traditionally seen as a state of nature which nation-states have to consider surviving.

Institutions, Norms, and Values

Having established the nature of anarchy in a constructivist environment, it is necessary to consider the concept of international institutions and their foundations. Although intergovernmental organizations need to be considered in this question, this essay will depart from the traditional view of institutions as formal organizations and only do so once the nature of the underlying institutions is established since this enables a discussion without combining two separate, but connected, factors (Duffield, 2007). Instead, it will follow John Duffield's (2007) definition of institutions as "relatively stable sets of related constitutive, regulative, and procedural norms and rules that pertain to the international system, the actors in the system [...], and their activities." (pp. 7-8). This definition enables a view of institutions as sets of norms and rules which provides the opportunity to address

the final component in the search for the foundations of institutions: values.

Since rules are codified norms, they share similar foundations at their core. And it is precisely this core that holds the foundation for the challenges in the proliferation of institutions which can be seen through their analysis. Norms are in their essence ought statements that are formed through a process that combines the values of individual actors with the values of a specific group, thus creating a system with values that partly reflects those of the individuals, while simultaneously creating a strong sense of belonging with a group (Mitchell, 1999). Assessing this dynamic between the individual and the group from a constructive perspective visualizes the impact that the structure and the actor have on one another. A norm can only withstand the test of time if enough individuals share its values highlighting the impact that an actor has on the structure itself. At the same time, through the social, or legal, penalties attached to the violation of norms, the impact of the structure on the individual actor is clearly visible. This dynamic can then be further reduced into a process of interactions where, based on the values of individuals, norms, and institutions are shaped that then, in turn, influence the values of the individuals creating both an individual and a group identity. And it is precisely this process that is of interest to this essay since it can be applied to the international system.



Through the previously discussed process, values are seen as a set of norms, of both internal and external nature, that an individual applies to their being and identity. In turn, these values then act on the group identity and its values, closing the circle of interaction (Mitchell 1999, 186-187). Therefore, nation-states find themselves as part of two of these circles, on the one hand, they represent the group identity of their peoples, while on the other, they are the individuals in the state-dominated international system, interacting with the topic of this essay, institutions. While the formation of national identity is in itself a contested and debated subject that deserves further inquiry, this argument calls upon different approaches like cosmopolitanism and post-colonialism to analyze the interactions between nation-states and international institutions since this enables a deeper look at their effectiveness in the mitigation of anarchy and the challenges they face to achieve this.

Cosmopolitanism and Post-Colonialism: At Odds?


While it is clear that a homogenous set of values and a shared identity will create institutions that are acceptable to all, this raises concerns about the process through which this could be achieved since the forced implementation of a certain set of values akin to colonial history should be avoided. To further explore this strain between a drive for common values and the avoidance of colonial patterns of domination, the theories of cosmopolitanism and post-colonialism can be used to expand on this conflict between individual heritage and global peace. Here, cosmopolitanism will provide a perspective on possibilities regarding the permeation of global values into national societies and its normative nature will further provide the chance to address this theory from a post-co-

lonial perspective to highlight the difficulties this kind of endeavor faces when considering it through local identities and the traditions attached to it. By combining these two approaches it will then be possible to assess if additional institutions would have a positive effect on the international stage and what challenges have to be overcome to effectively mitigate anarchy.

Commencing with cosmopolitanism, a theory characterized by its normative approach toward universal core values and the transformation of the world along the lines of a peaceful world society beyond the concept of nation-states. While these main characteristics are shared by most cosmopolitan approaches, this theory, like others in the realm of International Relations, consists of many different sub-theories with their focus and slight differences (Kleingeld & Brown, 2019). For this argument, a focus will be set on two different cosmopolitan approaches: moral and political cosmopolitanism. Moral cosmopolitanism has its roots in liberal theories of justice like those of Immanuel Kant or John Rawls through which it aims to build a system beyond the nation-state in which the same considerations of justice are awarded to every person regardless of their origin or heritage resulting in global institutions reflecting a societal consensus on the foundational liberal values (Jabri, 2007 p. 719; Beitz, 2005). While this approach to cosmopolitanism is of great merit from a Western, liberal, perspective, its universal nature and grounding in the ethics of the Enlightenment pose significant issues from a postcolonial perspective (Jabri, 2007).

A major complication arises when one considers the issue that liberal cosmopolitanism is based on an ethical framework that is aimed at the primacy of human rights and, through its connection with the Enlightenment, creates a clear hierarchy with systems of democratic

nature and ideals on top. From a post-colonial perspective, this has the consequence that the cosmopolitan ideal is used by those societies that possess significant resources to build an international order that allows for interventions based on the ideals that those societies stand for (Jabri, 2007 p. 721). Furthermore, through its singular moral standpoint, this approach to cosmopolitanism disregards the post-colonial notion of hierarchy based on power distribution that it shares with constructivism. Consequentially, this view aids the efforts of former colonial powers to, once again, engage in a narrative of progress and civilization and, thus, disregard their colonial past. Last, this approach, through its Western foundations, also largely focuses on the Western approach to politics and its understanding of modernity leading to a project that, while it enables some, constrains others (Jabri, 2007 pp. 722-723). It is because of these issues that a different kind of cosmopolitanism should also be examined.



Political cosmopolitanism draws its foundation not from a given set of values, rather it grounds itself in the political sphere of argumentation and discourse. Through this, a cosmopolitan society does not have one ideal shape, instead, it uses political interaction to build an institution of discussion with equal voices for all actors. Additionally, this approach takes a different stance on culture. Instead of viewing it as a part of the private realm, it highlights it

and involves it in the political discourse, thus incorporating its values (Jabri, 2007 pp. 724-725). From a post-colonial perspective, political cosmopolitanism enables a critique of the current system and its institutions and, in the process, moves beyond a set hierarchy and the connected issues of a superior set of values. Furthermore, its discursive nature allows for the consideration of smaller units in the search for an overarching system (Jabri 2007, 725). And it is precisely this combination of openness and acceptance of different units under a common cosmopolitan identity that brings this argument back to its starting point.

Institutions: Past, Present, and Future

Through the search for the nature of international anarchy, this essay has shown its origin as a human structure instead of a natural phenomenon as well as the importance that identity and interaction carry in its

perception and its possible change. Following this, the analysis of the foundation of international institutions has highlighted a similar constructed nature that is based on cycles of interaction between individuals, nation-states, and the institutions themselves, which consequently means that they, like anarchy, are a product of interaction within a changeable structure. To explore ways to affect these existing structures and to assess the effectiveness of institutions in their mitigation of anarchy, this essay explored two cosmopolitan approaches, settling on po-

litical cosmopolitanism and supplementing it with post-colonial insights, due to its social and cooperative nature and its lack of a set hierarchy in conjunction with a critical perspective on the current institutions and their history.

Through this framework, the issues faced by current institutions in their effort to mitigate anarchy are clearly visible. Since they were often conceptualized with the realist experience of war and strong liberal values in mind (Trent & Schnurr, 2017). Additionally, this focus on Western values further represents the colonial

past and the power dynamics that made them possible. Consequentially, this means that these institutions were created in an environment suffering from the realist understanding of anarchy necessitating a clear response that moved beyond a system of power struggle and armed conflict. Therefore, these institutions which are still in place today, are only partially effective

in their mitigation of anarchy since they were created by those in power and through this perpetuate the realist anarchical assumption. On the other hand, an approach to institutions that incorporates a constructivist understanding of anarchy with a foundation of political cosmopolitanism and post-colonialism for institutions contains the opportunity for change.

Such an approach would rely on discourse instead of dictation to find a system of values

Members influence their institutions as much as institutions influence them, [thus] international anarchy could be replaced with a foundation of cooperative conduct in world politics.

and norms that is acceptable to all participants in international society. This would not only create institutions with broad acceptance but similar to social norms, it would create pressures to act within this system which could then be reinforced through legal norms creating far more effective institutions. Additionally, this approach would also contain a different understanding of anarchy, framing it as a social structure and, therefore, an institution in itself. Furthermore, since, as established, members influence their institutions as much as institutions influence them, international anarchy could be replaced with a foundation of cooperative conduct in world politics.

Conclusion

In conclusion, while current institutions were created with the mitigation of anarchy in mind, it is this fact that constrains them in the same effort. Through their assumptions about the international system and its construction around international anarchy, institutions are unable to explore options that lie beyond this concept. Using constructivist theory in conjunction with political cosmopolitanism and post-colonialism, this essay demonstrated that an international society beyond a realist understanding of anarchy is indeed possible, although it would require a radical transformation of the institutions that currently govern international affairs. And it is this transformative process that will likely prevent a rapid shift beyond the institutions that are currently in place. On the other hand, in line with constructivist thought, the possibility of change does not solely lie with the structure; instead, individuals retain the power to act upon the structure and to slowly change it. Furthermore, it is through this line of thought that the importance of our values is once again highlighted since they interact with those of others on all levels of society thus, in the process, creating, upholding, and replacing the institutions in our life. While to some this might raise the question if this approach will result in many unnecessary and ineffective ethical institutions, it is also vital to emphasize that values, and therefore institutions, are a reflection of human society, which in the modern world grows increasingly complex, therefore raising the question whether there can also be too few institutions in our world.

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
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Powering Ahead: Fortifying EU Relations through Hydrogen Trade

This article was reviewed by Timothy Chan



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Introduction

Energy security, a fundamental pillar of any state's economic and social stability, pertains to the uninterrupted availability of energy resources at an affordable cost (Cherp and Jewell 2014). The concept extends beyond mere availability, encompassing aspects such as energy efficiency, sustainability, and environmental friendliness (Directive 2019/944). As global climate change concerns intensify, achieving energy security increasingly entails a transition from high-carbon to low-carbon resources, a shift that necessitates innovative and sustainable energy solutions.

Hydrogen, a versatile and efficient energy carrier, has emerged as one of the potential answers to this energy conundrum (Steinberger-Wilckens et al., 2017). Characterised by its high energy content and environmental sustainability when produced by using electricity from renewable sources, hydrogen is being eyed as an essential player in the drive towards a low-carbon economy, especially within the European Union (EU). The EU strategy recognises the role of hydrogen in this energy transformation (Hydrogen Strategy, REPowerEU Plan), underlining its importance for meeting the bloc's ambitious climate goals and ensuring long-term energy security.

Central to this approach is the emphasis on clean hydrogen, primarily produced through water electrolysis power only by renewable electricity sources. However, given the EU's diverse energy needs and geographical variances in renewable energy availability, merely producing hydrogen domestically is unlikely to suffice. To ensure a steady and sustainable hydrogen supply, the EU needs to tap into the global hydrogen market, making

international hydrogen trade a cornerstone of its energy strategy. Currently, hydrogen is used most often for transport. Although, technology and regulation are approaching the commissioning of hydrogen as an energy carrier.

The following sections delve deeper into the EU's hydrogen strategy and objectives, potential international partners for hydrogen trade, the benefits, and challenges of this trade for energy security, and recommendations for strengthening the EU's hydrogen trade partnerships. The goal is to provide a comprehensive overview of the role of international hydrogen trade in bolstering the EU's energy security, and to underscore the importance of continued efforts and partnerships in this critical endeavour.

EU's hydrogen production: expectations vs. reality

By taking the Ukrainian side after the war outbreak in 2022, the EU had to ensure the security of its citizens. Following the declaration of heads of countries on the conflict, there has been a high risk of discontinuity of energy sources supply from the Russian side. Coupled with the economic the COVID-19 pandemic implications, Europeans have been suffering from unstable and constant rise of energy prices.




Figure 1: Energy prices (European Central Bank, 2022).

The EU highlighted hydrogen as one of the solutions for the above. The REPowerEU increases the hydrogen production volume almost fourfold compared to the FITFOR55 climate package. The assumed production of hydrogen is 20 million tonnes annually by 2030. The half shall be produced in Member States, the second part shall be distributed from third countries. Aurora states that this target is achievable as expected at the end of the decade. Also, the directions and actions enabling the EU to get as close as possible to its ambitions are already known.

REPowerEU: It is a plan for saving energy, producing clean energy and diversifying the European energy supplies. It is backed by financial and legal measures to build the green and decentralised energy sector that Europe needs.

Potential Partners for Hydrogen Trade for EU

Beyond replacing the conventional energy sources from Russia, the EU aims to reduce its reliance on fossil fuels and transition to a carbon-neutral economy. This done by justifying the vast potential of green hydrogen as a clean energy source in the decarbonisation process. The EU's ambitious Hydrogen Strategy foresees the integration of this renewable energy source into various sectors of the economy such as transport, power, construction or heavy industry. To fulfil these plans, both in the qualitative aspect on the range of sectors in deploying hydrogen and quantitative for produced volumes, the EU seeks to forge strong partnerships with third countries on hydrogen trade. Some of these promising cooperative options are worth exploring.

A. North African Countries: Morocco, Algeria & Egypt

Morocco, Algeria, and Egypt, all hold significant promise as potential hydrogen producers due to their abundant renewable energy potential, particularly solar and wind energy. Intense sunlight and steady wind speeds are comfortable conditions for the operation of plants powered by these two natural energy sources (van Wijk and Wouters, 2021). These countries have been progressively focusing on hydrogen (Hydrogen Strategy of Morocco, Algeria National Hydrogen Roadmap, Egypt Hydrogen Strategy), mainly driven by the potential economic benefit from the EU. In the year 2050, the global hydrogen trade may generate approximately USD 100 billion per year in North Africa (Deloitte, 2023).

With a robust renewable energy sector in particular, solar energy amounting to 740 MG installed capacity (North Africa Post, 2023) and proximity to Europe, Morocco is a viable candidate for supplying green hydrogen to UE. In the case of Algeria and Egypt, both oil and gas-producing countries, hydrogen projects are based not only on renewable electricity but also on gas with carbon capture and storage. Algeria National Hydrogen Roadmap, disclosed in March 2023, sets a goal to generate and export between 30-40TWh of hydrogen as well as H₂ derivatives by 2040. It's worth noting that a million tonnes of hydrogen equate to about 33TWh of energy. The strategic plan entails efforts to attract foreign investment and grants, alongside establishing global strategic collaborations.

Despite the promising outlook, North African countries still have a long way to go before it can fully export green hydrogen. The major obstacle appears to be the not fully developed

gas network connections with Europe. At present, North Africa has two infrastructure routes to supply hydrogen. In the western part, there are two electricity grid inter-connectors between Spain and Morocco, each 700 MW. Additionally, gas infrastructure allows transporting hydrogen from Algeria via Italy. There is a need to construct a third transportation pipeline. The most convenient plan is to extend the second pipeline to Greece, which could unite the existing infrastructure with the Middle East (van Wijk, Wouters Rachidi and Ikken, 2019). Furthermore, water scarcity in the dry region presents a challenge, as the production of green hydrogen through electrolysis requires substantial amounts of water. Removing existing barriers and providing a sufficient hydrogen flow between two continents requires time. Significant investments in renewable energy infrastructure such as desalination plants to mitigate insufficient water supply, and technical expertise are still needed for this vision to become a reality.



Figure 2: Hydrogen infrastructure in North Africa (Van Wijk, Wouters, Rachidi and Ikken, 2022).

B. Chile

Chile is another potential partner for the EU in hydrogen trade. In its ambitious National Green Hydrogen Strategy, Chile aims to produce the world's lowest-cost hydrogen of USD 1,5 per kg by 2030. It also assumes Chile becoming one of the top three hydrogen exporters by 2040.

The modernised EU-Chile trade agreement concluded in 2023 provides a framework for

this promising collaboration. The agreement ensures non-discriminatory access to the Chilean hydrogen market and fosters harmonisation of certification schemes for renewable fuels. Various European institutions, such as the European Investment Bank and KfW Development Bank, are already supporting Chile's growing renewable hydrogen industry through substantial investments. However, Chile also has a problem with direct transport to the EU. Yet, there is a possibility to learn from the experience of supplying hydrogen to Japan. In the case of the Asian recipient, Chile uses ammonia as a hydrogen storage by combining atmospheric nitrogen and hydrogen at relatively high pressures and temperatures (Fúnez Guerra et al., 2020).

C. Norway

With its well-established hydrogen production and export infrastructure, Norway is a vital partner in international hydrogen trade for the EU. Hydrogen production currently stands at 225,000 tonnes, primarily sourced from natural gas for industrial utilisation. Producing grey hydrogen by steam reforming results in substantial CO₂ emissions. Carbon dioxide capture equipment needs to be installed, thus the conversion of classy hydrogen as usable and tradeable among European standards.

Norway produces the most affordable energy from renewable resources (van Wijk and Wouters, 2021). It implies reasonable LCOH (Levelized Cost of Hydrogen) by using water electrolysis. Thus, cooperation with Norway can ensure stable green hydrogen prices, partly given the long-term expertise in hydropower generation. Compared to the other described countries, Norway appears also to be a more secure option due to the democratic political system.

In recent years, Norway and Germany have signed several agreements to enhance cooperation in hydrogen production and trade. Norway and Germany on 5th January signed joint declarations to increase the production of renewable energy and develop (green) hydrogen as they both seek to both cut their CO2 emissions and wean Germany from its reliance on Russian gas. The declarations outlined steps for cooperation in the areas of hydrogen, battery technology and offshore wind, as well as carbon capture and storage. Besides cooperation at the government level, local companies have ambitious development plans and invest in hydrogen technologies. Norwegian energy company, Equinor, aims to invest in clean hydrogen projects for export to the EU, with initial low-emission hydrogen production capabilities of 2 GW by 2030, increasing to 10 GW by 2038. This hydrogen would feed into a proposed pipeline to Germany, which is currently being evaluated. On the other side, RWE, a German multinational energy company, has signed an agreement with Equinor to cooperate in developing the hydrogen economy. RWE intends to purchase and utilise blue hydrogen transported by Equinor. In addition, the two companies plan to collaborate on projects producing green hydrogen from offshore wind energy sources. Moreover, the announcement of a new hydrogen production plant's development in the partnership between Provaris and Norwegian Hydrogen (Provaris Energy) propels Norway to the limelight as it's set to become one of the biggest green hydrogen producers in the Scandinavian region. The proposed hydrogen facility is expected to reach a total capacity of 270 MW once fully operational, capable of producing up to 40,000 tonnes of green hydrogen each year. So far, a capacity of 20 MW has been approved, and an additional application for a further 250 MW capacity is currently under review. Furthermore, the project will employ Provaris' innovative solution for the storage and transportation of compressed hydrogen to various parts of Europe. The planned installation could potentially mitigate over 500,000 tonnes of CO2 emissions annually.




Figure 3: Equinor and RWE to cooperate on energy security and decarbonization (Equinor, RWE, 2023)

Benefits and challenges of International Hydrogen Trade

As hydrogen can be produced in a wide variety of geographic locations where there's a supply of renewable energy and water, it has the potential to significantly diversify the EU's energy portfolio. This diversification reduces the reliance on specific countries or regions for energy supplies, decreasing geopolitical risks and enhancing energy security (Stringer, 2008).

Further, green hydrogen provides an opportunity to move away from a heavy reliance on fossil fuels. As the world pushes towards a carbon-neutral future, the use of green hydrogen as an alternative fuel source could play a crucial role in achieving climate goals. Most importantly, to reduce EU greenhouse gas emissions by 55% by 2030 compared to 1990 and achieving climate neutrality by 2050 (FITFOR55). In the face of disruptions to fossil fuel supply or price volatility, green hydrogen could serve as a reliable alternative, enhancing the resilience of the EU's energy supply.

In addition, the growth of the global hydrogen market could stimulate competition and drive innovation in hydrogen production, transportation, and usage technologies. It would encourage a variety of players to enter the market, creating a competitive environment that could lead to lower prices, improved services, and other advancements that make the use of hydrogen more efficient and cost-effective.

Despite the significant potential benefits, the international trade of hydrogen also presents several challenges and barriers. Hydrogen's low energy density by volume makes its transportation and storage technically

challenging and costly. The assumed costs are USD 9 trillion of cumulative investments in the global hydrogen supply chain, including USD 3.1 trillion in developing economies (Deloitte, 2023). Another crucial aspect is the certification of hydrogen quality (European Clean Hydrogen Alliance, 2023). Different methods of hydrogen production have varying levels of environmental impact, so clear certification is necessary to ensure that green hydrogen is indeed produced sustainably and diligently. Developing these standards on a global scale will be a complex process, requiring international cooperation and consensus.

Lastly, there are also challenges associated with ensuring fair and open market access. As the hydrogen market grows, it will be necessary to ensure it does not become dominated by some large players, and that access to the market is fair for all potential producers and consumers (IEA, 2021). This is crucial for maintaining competition and avoiding price manipulation or supply monopolies.

Taking into consideration the realities above, the EU shall desire its currency, the euro, to play a significant role in the global green hydrogen trade (Leonard et al., 2021). To decrease the financial risks associated with cross-border hydrogen transactions, it's crucial to support the development of a structured international hydrogen market based on euro transactions. Achieving this would require the EU to continue investing in green hydrogen projects, increase demand from end consumers in member countries, and conduct transactions in euros. As the hydrogen market is still emerging, the European Commission should develop an index for euro-denominated transactions related to green hydrogen, which would ultimately increase market

liquidity and strengthen the euro's position as the dominant currency in future hydrogen trade.

Summary

International hydrogen trade presents multiple benefits for energy security. Firstly, it allows for the diversification of the energy mix, reducing dependence on a single resource and thereby mitigating the risks associated with supply disruptions. Additionally, it supports transition to a more resilient and environmentally friendly energy system by reducing reliance on fossil fuels. Lastly, it aligns with global decarbonisation efforts, further bolstering the EU's position as a leader in climate action. Looking at the situation in the EU, with certainty, the organisation has recognised the potential of green hydrogen for a sustainable energy transition and securing the good as is energy to its citizens. The hydrogen bolsters the EU's position as a leader in climate action.

Simultaneously, it's crucial to recognise that international hydrogen trade isn't without its challenges. Technical issues related to hydrogen transportation and storage, standardisation of hydrogen quality and certification, market fairness, and cross-country policy coordination can all act as potential barriers. Nonetheless, these hurdles are not insurmountable, and with robust strategies and international cooperation, the EU can harness

the potential of global hydrogen trade. However, the feasibility of exporting hydrogen remains questionable due to high production and transportation costs. The above makes green hydrogen more expensive than hydrogen produced from fossil fuels, although this is expected to change as technology improves and the cost of renewable energy continues to fall. Building the necessary infrastructure will be a significant undertaking, requiring large-scale investment and international co-operation. EU Member States have varied

The development of the EU's green hydrogen market provides new geopolitical opportunities in the form of international energy partnerships, when the EU is the central hub.

capabilities for renewable hydrogen production, and a fair, competitive market with unhindered cross-border trade could bring significant benefits in terms of competition, price accessibility, and green hydrogen supply security.

The EU, as a long-standing net importer of energy, will continue to be

so also in the context of a green hydrogen economy. Hydrogen could become part of the EU's international, regional, and bilateral diplomatic efforts in line with its energy and climate policy. The development of the EU's green hydrogen market provides new geopolitical opportunities in the form of international energy partnerships, when the EU is the central hub. Given the natural resources, physical interconnections, and technological developments, priority suppliers should be the countries of North Africa and Norway.

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Is My Crystal Ball Better than Yours?



Hans-Ulrich Seidt

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Strategic foresight is a serious discipline and a risky business. Even with profound experience and a systematic methodology, attempts to look into the future remain close to the realms of speculation and ideology.

Oracles and astrologers

Over centuries people believed that the predictions of wise women and men could link the present with the reality of an uncertain future. In fairy tales fortune-tellers turned to their crystal balls. The Greeks in antiquity consulted the Oracle of Delphi. They believed that neglecting the prophesies of mystic seers led to severe punishment by the gods. They feared a terrible precedent: The unfortunate Trojans who did not listen to Cassandra were either killed or enslaved.

The Book of Daniel reported that in Babylon Belshazzar's astrologers were unable to interpret a mysterious writing on the wall. Thus, the king ordered the Jewish prophet Daniel to decipher the text. But when he read the warning from heaven to king and court and foretold the fall of Babylon, it was already too late. The enemy was at the gates, conquered and destroyed the city.

Wallenstein, a smart businessman and soldier of fortune during the War of the Thirty Years, employed the astrologer Seni as advisor on future developments. But even this personal early warning system could not prevent that Wallenstein was assassinated by the officers he trusted most.

Risks of gambling

Agnostics among political or military leaders acted without consulting oracles or priests. They took the risk of dangerous political games: "The die is cast!" declared Caesar when he crossed the Rubicon.

During the 19th century Goethe's "Egmont" was one of the most performed dramas in Ger-

man language. It focused not only on the tragic history of his romantic hero but gave the viewers a didactic introduction into game theory and the strategic challenges of counterinsurgency.

At the beginning of the play, a fictional Niccolò Machiavelli, who in real life was a fervent card player, warns the Princess of Parma, the governor of the Dutch provinces, that a rebellion of her subjects is imminent. He recommends subtle methods of accommodation and appeasement to avoid it. But the principals in Spain do not follow the recommendations of the policy advisor on the spot.

They recall the princess and replace her by the commander of the Spanish troops, Duke Alba. After his arrival he gives the order to arrest the leaders of the popular movement and thus provokes the general uprising. Alba compares his fatal decision to playing a lottery.

The head of the rebellion, Maurice of Orange, meets his visitors behind a chess board. In the end, he prevails as the political player with strategic foresight, whereas Alba's playing lottery proves to be a recipe for disaster. When in 1939 Hermann Göring learned about the British declaration of war, he asked Hitler: "Shouldn't we stop playing vabanque?" But Hitler had no intention of giving up his high-risk strategy of "all or nothing" and answered: "I always played vabanque."

Facts and circumstances

How can the limitless potential of human ambitions be transferred into responsible action? How is it possible to avoid risks and obstacles without consulting magicians and fortune-tellers?

In the second half of the fifth century B.C. the Athenian strategist Thucydides tried to give the answer. In his history of the Peloponnesian War, he followed a methodology developed by a contemporary, the famous physician Hippocrates.

In the past priests had predicted the future by cutting up sacrificed animals. After a careful look at the inner organs, they drew their conclusions and interpreted them to the public. This procedure was called analysis. To find the cause of an illness and to recommend a proper treatment to his patients, Hippocrates applied the idea of analysis to the human body. Based on his professional experience he formulated a diagnosis, gave a medical prognosis, and suggested a therapy.

Thucydides transferred Hippocrates' approach into the political domain. Like a medical doctor he analyzed the origins and the consequences of the long war between Athens and Sparta. He collected all available pieces of information, compared them carefully and distinguished between symptoms and causes. Thucydides paid close attention to the details of political maneuvers and military operations but tried to assess the impact of the war on the whole body and even the psyche of the suffering Hellenic world.

More than two thousand years later, Carl von Clausewitz followed in the footsteps of Thucydides. In his magisterial work "On War" he explained why any strategy must start with a thorough analysis of all relevant factors. According to Clausewitz, strategic foresight cannot be based on abstract doctrines. It requires practical experience and historical knowledge and must consider concrete facts and their specific circumstances. Human beings are acting differently in time and space. They are driven by

ambitions and interests, by hate and love, by greed and sometimes even by the idea of honor. The strategic observer and political planner is watching a drama.

To achieve their objectives, the players are selecting instruments from different domains. For Clausewitz, an officer in the time of the Napoleonic wars, military means were the decisive ones. They are still crucial today, and strategic foresight is not allowed to ignore military preparations and the conduct of war. But it must include also other relevant factors in the field of economy, in science and technology, in culture and communication.



Picture 1: An antique illustration (around 440 - 430 B.C.) of King Aigeus as he asked for prophecy in front of the Pythia. Displaced in the collection of Altes Museum in Berlin, Germany. Photographed by "Zde" File:Oracle of Delphi, red-figure kylix, 440-430 BC, Kodros Painter, Berlin F 2538, 141668.jpg - Wikimedia Commons

Ideology and action

With the development of modern mass societies, the socio-economic and cultural-communicative domains became central areas of strategic interest. Throughout the latter half of the 19th century new political currents and intellectual impulses emerged. They became ever more

dynamic and volatile. But influential thinkers analyzed them within a surprisingly strict conceptual framework and formulated quasi-religious doctrines.

Marx, Engels, and Lenin had read "On War" carefully. But they forced Clausewitz' thoughts into the rigid tradition of Hegel's systematic philosophy and assumed that the future of humankind could be predicted with scientific pretensions. The ideological certainty and even absurdity of Marxism-Leninism ended only with the decline and fall of the Soviet Union. In the global drama of the 20th century, the founding fathers of socialism had played the role of impressive, but false prophets.

Early on, the French philosopher Georges Sorel had raised his warning voice and argued that the fate of modern societies could not be predicted with the help of ideological constructions. For him, the future depended on the spontaneous and collective expressions of the human will. Sorel regarded the strategic forecast of social facts or trends and the drafting of corresponding plans not only as utopian, but as reactionary: "Tout plan préétabli est utopique et réactionnaire".

Sorel preached direct action, and his philosophy had considerable consequences. In France, Italy, and Spain it not only inspired right-wing intellectuals but provided the conceptual base for the anarcho-sindicalist movement. Unlike the well-organized Marxist-Leninist parties, the anarcho-sindicalists rejected systematic forecasting and coherent planning. The ensuing rift among the political left recalled the memory of medieval theological debates with their prosecution and condemnation of heretics.

Today's crystal balls


In the 21st century, informed advice on the future is, at least in theory, based on data. It is not provided through astrologers or philosophers but by consultants, think tanks and government institutions like the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment.

Modern forecasting is based on a wide range of methodologies which include the qualitative and quantitative analyses of trends and mega-trends. High-speed computers calculate the chances and risks of financial investments and draft the scenarios of threats by hostile powers. Opinion polls recommend politicians how to position themselves during an election campaign.

But there is still no guarantee that analyses and strategies based on polls, data and algorithms will lead to the expected results. Risky speculations will remain a dangerous feature of investment banking. And disruptive events like a world-wide pandemic or a major earthquake along California's San Andreas Fault can change demographic and economic mega-trends.

There is no doubt: Despite modern methodologies uncertainty about the future is growing rapidly in today's political arenas. Will the mass societies of the 21st century accept the predictions of scientific forecasts? Or will they take part in the political games of dictators and elected officials? They may still follow the glittering promises of ideologues and false prophets.

If we look back in history, fundamental questions arise: What has changed since the times when the Greeks consulted the Oracle of Delphi, and the Trojans ignored the warnings of Cassandra? And should today's desire to forecast and shape the future not be balanced by deeper insight into the illusions and limits of human power?



The World Youth Day as a Diplomat for the Universal Church



Sophie Schirmer [in](#)

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During his lifetime Jesus Christ had 12 disciples. At the 37th World Youth Day (WYD) it has been 1.5 million. Taking place from August 1st to 6th in Lisbon young Catholics from all around the world gathered to deepen their faith and connect with fellow believers. While the participants emphasize their joy during the encounter, it offers the Catholic Church the opportunity to strengthen the feeling for the Universal world church in its own youth in a diplomatic way. Especially in times when individual constituent churches, predominantly located within secularized Western Europe, appear to prefer charting their own course.

A highlight for many was the opportunity to closely witness and engage with the Pope. As one eagerly awaited the arrival of the Holy Father amidst hundreds of waving flags and thousands of other young adults, all collec-

tively chanting "Esta es la juventud del Papa" (This is the youth of the Pope), the concerns, opinions, and tensions within the various ecclesial communities seemed to fade away. Even in the absence of papal presence during numerous program sessions, the joy and enthusiasm remained undiminished.

The week's program was structured by devotions with Pope Francis from the welcoming on Thursday to the stations of the cross on Friday and the huge final mass on Sunday morning. Apart from these central events, there were mainly forms of participation with a cultural or religious nature. The adolescents utilized the waiting periods during the papal audiences and the smaller agenda items to acquaint themselves with fellow young Catholics hailing from the shores of Australia to the frozen tundra of Alaska. They acquainted themselves with global diversity, all of which



Picture by Alejandro Espejo LC

contribute to the constitution of the world Church. The unifying factor amidst all of this is the shared belief in Jesus Christ and the one holy Catholic Church. In this way, WYD supports cultural exchange and mutual understanding.

While naysayers might assert that this assembly predominantly caters to conservative factions seeking resurgence in the wave of neo-evangelism, they overlook the resonating purpose of unity. Even as these young minds are lectured by bishops in a manner they deem old-fashioned, it serves the overarching goal of nurturing Church cohesion. This cohesion benefits from the fact that every Catholic youth, irrespective of geographical origins, imbibes the same dogma. This rings especially true in contexts such as Germany, where the Church sometimes seems more of a service provider than a custodian of a life-transforming message.

The event raises one's elation and enthusiasm that continues to flourish even after days of poor sleep, bracing cold showers, and queuing for meals, channelling it to ignite the flame of faith. This renewed vitality not only affects the participants but also the Church's mission as a whole. The youth return to their communities invigorated and resolute in their commitment to proclaiming their faith. In this context, World Youth Day functions as a catalyst for the propagation of faith, encouraging young individuals to act as ambassadors of hope and spiritual transformation.

Engaging actively in workshops and sharing testimonies with fellow believers strengthens self-efficacy, potentially motivating them to assume responsibilities within local congregations. Young Catholics are empowered and emboldened to make autonomous decisions and establish initiatives. An example of this is

"Nightfever", which emerged after the 2005 World Youth Day in Cologne and now serves as an evening of adoration, pastoral care, and prayer in 200 cities across 28 countries beyond World Youth Day itself.

In conclusion, World Youth Day sends a message of hope by uniting the youth of the world in a shared journey of faith and pro-

moting a diplomatic network that extends far beyond the event itself. It strengthens not only the personal faith but also the unity of the Universal Church. All without the need for loud rhetoric or the imposition of slogans. It's a celebration that echoes not just in Lisbon's cobblestone streets, but in the hearts and souls of the faithful worldwide.



Picture by Alejandro Espejo LC

EPIS BASICS: TOTAL DEFENSE

In EPIS Basics, our authors explain basic knowledge of international foreign affairs and security policies. This encompasses basic theories, organisations and events. This series is presented in depth here in the magazine. You can also find other smaller contributions on our Instagram page.

 **Pablo Mathis**

Pablo Mathis currently studies Security Studies at Leiden University in the Netherlands. Pablo's main area of interest is national security, with a special focus on great-power competition and nuclear and conventional deterrence.



"In a world where the big fish eat small fish and the small fish eat shrimps, Singapore must become a poisonous shrimp." (Lee Kuan Yew, 1966)

History and Conceptualization

Total defense arose during the Cold War in neutral countries like Switzerland, Finland, Sweden, and Singapore. Faced with the prospect of having to defend the country without the assistance of allies, and living in a world where "big fish eat small fish and small fish eat shrimp", small neutral countries sought to become poisonous shrimps. They thereby implemented the concept of total defense, involving the entire society in defense efforts. Borrowing from Singapore's conceptualization, we may conceive total defense as entailing five components: military, economic, civil, social, and psychological defense. In the following, we look at each element.

Military Defense

Military defense is characterized by territorial defense. Territorial defense sees a country develop defensive military capabilities to deter by denial. Military defense also entails mandatory military service and an emphasis on modern military technology. These measures were intended to overcome an aggressor's numerical advantage over a neutral country.

Economic Defense

Cicero once remarked that money is the sinew of war. This remains true today, as the economy dictates a country's fiscal capabilities and consequently influences military budgets. Current debates on securing supply chains and protecting intellectual property are intended to ensure the continuing prosperity of economies, therefore contributing to economic defense.

Civil Defense

Civil defense incorporates the protection of critical infrastructure. The privatization of industry sectors after the Cold War means that public-private cooperation is crucial in safeguarding critical infrastructure. Securing critical infrastructure is essential to upholding the population's morale and military logistics.

Civil defense also concerns capacity building amongst citizens. In crises, the functioning of institutions is impeded, making citizens first responders. Therefore, citizens must know how to act during crises. For this purpose, Sweden has distributed leaflets informing individuals on how to behave during emergencies and how to detect fake news.

Social and Psychological Defense

The ability to detect fake news is also relevant for social defense, which aims at preserving societal unity. Especially in democracies, the risk of malicious actors purposely exploiting democratic debates to polarize society is high.


Only a unified society can resist aggression and have common principles to fight for. Hence, social defense, together with upholding morale through civil defense, is key to psychological defense, that being the willingness of society to resist aggression.

Conclusion

The concept of total defence originated during the Cold War. Today, Singapore, Finland, and Sweden employ this concept. In today's multifaceted threat environment, and the war in Ukraine, the whole of society approach advocated by total defense might well proliferate.

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